September 27, 2006
Chileans, Bolivians Top Latin America in Optimism, Barómetro Iberoamericano Finds
Published 10/27/06
Chileans were the Latin Americans who felt most confident that their country was heading in the right direction in the spring of 2006, followed by Bolivians. Those most pessimistic about their countries’ future were Ecuadorans and Costa Ricans.
These are some of the findings of Barómetro Iberoamericano 2006, a multi-country poll conducted by the Iberoamerican Consortium of Market Research and Consulting (known as CIMA, for its Spanish acronym). The survey includes samples from 13 Latin American countries plus Puerto Rico, Spain, Portugal and the Latino population of the continental United States.
The wide-ranging poll examined attitudes in the Americas and on the Iberian peninsula regarding governance, presidential leadership, political legitimacy and democratic values. Seventeen polling firms took part, interviewing 8,410 people in March 2006. Country sample sizes ranged from 300 in Guatemala to more than 1,000 in Argentina and Bolivia. The survey, which has been conducted since 1992, also included, for the first time, a sample of 213 Latinos in the United States.
Overall the Latin Americans, U.S. Latinos and Iberians surveyed were evenly divided over whether their country was headed in the right direction (48%). But there was wide variation by country. While more than eight out of ten Chileans (85%) and seven out of ten Bolivians (69%) said their country was on the right path, fewer than one in five Ecuadorans (8%) and one in three Costa Ricans (21%) did.
The optimism in Chile and Bolivia in 2006 may have been fueled in part by the election of new presidents in 2006. Both countries were surveyed in March, when Chile’s first female president, Michelle Bachelet, took office, and when Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales, was completing his third month in power.
Chilean optimism, however, is not new. Residents of the country, which boasts one of South America’s most dynamic economies, were also mostly upbeat in April 2005 (72% said they were on the right path) and in May 2004 (74%). Bolivians, on the other hand, changed in one year from being among the most pessimistic of Latin Americans (in April 2005, only 18 percent believed their country was on the right path) to one of the most hopeful. Bolivia is South America’s poorest country and has historically been among the least stable. Morales’s electoral victory came after his two predecessors were forced from power amid mass demonstrations, spurred in large part by the Aymara Indian leader himself.
Venezuela, whose economy has been buoyed by high oil prices, was Latin America’s third most optimistic country in the spring of 2006 with 66 percent saying it was headed in the right direction, according to the poll.
The two least hopeful countries—Ecuador and Costa Rica—have both been rocked by political unrest and scandal in recent years. Over the past decade, four Ecuadoran presidents have been forced out of office before completing their terms amid allegations of incompetence and corruption. Moreover, despite being South America’s second-largest exporter of crude oil to the United States, the country is burdened with a large foreign debt and an overwhelmingly poor population. Not surprisingly, the percentage of Ecuadorans believing the country was headed in the right direction declined from 17 percent in May 2004 to 11 percent in August 2005 to 8 percent in March 2006.
Costa Rica boasts a relatively robust economy and one of Latin America’s oldest and most stable democracies. But in 2005 the country endured bitter battles over the ratification of the Central American Free Trade Agreement, which was vehemently opposed by Costa Rica’s powerful labor movement. And in 2004, an investigation into political corruption implicated three ex-presidents. Over the past two years, the proportion of Costa Ricans saying their country was headed in the right direction has dropped from a third (32%) in May 2004 to a fourth (24%) in April 2005 to a fifth (21%) in March 2006.
On the issue of globalization, Chileans were again the Latin Americans most likely to register optimism. Eight out of ten Chileans said globalization had had “a positive impact” on their country, followed by Dominicans (78% positive impact), Brazilians (72%), Guatemalans (64%), Peruvians (61%), Colombians (56%) and Venezuelans (54%). Costa Ricans (52% positive impact) and Panamanians (47%) were divided on the question while Mexicans (43%), Ecuadorans (40%), and Bolivians (38%) tended not to view globalization as positive. Argentines were the least likely to see globalization as good for their country: less than a third (30%) said it had had a positive impact.
Other findings of the 2006 Iberobarómetro include:
• Less than half of those surveyed (43%) on average said that the proposal to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas would benefit their country. Chileans (75%), Guatemalans (57%) were the most likely to see this as beneficial while Costa Ricans (53%), Dominicans (51%), Peruvians (49%), Panamanians (49%), Mexicans (49%) and Colombians (45%) were divided. Generally unenthusiastic were Bolivians (40% in favor), Brazilians (37%) Venezuelans (35%), Ecuadorans (35%) and Argentines (13%).
• Argentines were by far the Latin Americans least likely to have a positive image of the United States (8% positive), followed by Venezuelans (26%), Brazilians (28%) and Bolivians (29%). Most likely to view the U.S. positively are Panamanians (56%), Chileans (51%), Costa Ricans (50%) and Colombians (49%).
• Asked to measure their empathy for Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez on a scale of 0 to 100, the countries surveyed on average gave him a 41. Ecuadorans gave him an 80, higher than Venezuelans themselves who gave their president a 69. Mexicans and Costa Ricans were the least enthusiastic about Chávez, with both giving him a 23.
• Cuban President Fidel Castro and U.S. President George Bush got the lowest average scores among the nine leaders rated. The Cuban communist received on average a rating of 35, with Ecuador the most favorable (67) followed by Argentina (46). Costa Rica (18) and Panama (22) gave Castro the lowest ratings. The two countries that liked Castro least liked Bush most. The U.S. president got a score of 51 in Panama and 45 in Costa Rica. He got his most negative scores in Argentina (8) and Venezuela (17). On average the countries surveyed gave Bush a score of 32.
• Chilean President Michelle Bachelet got the highest average rating of the leaders surveyed with a score of 53. She was most popular among fellow Chileans (86) Ecuadorans (69) and Argentines (59), least among Venezuelans (33) Dominicans (31) and Guatemalans (23). The other leaders rated were Brazilian President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva (average score of 50), Mexican President Vicente Fox (47), Argentine President Nestor Kirchner (46), Colombian President Álvaro Uribe (45) and Bolivian President Evo Morales (41).
Most Iraqis Want U.S. Troops Out Within a Year
Say U.S. Presence Provoking More Conflict Than it is Preventing
Approval of Attacks on U.S.-led Forces Rises to 6 in 10
Published September 27, 2006
Full Report
Questionnaire/Methodology
Transcript of Brookings Saban Center Briefing
A new WPO poll of the Iraqi public finds that seven in ten Iraqis want U.S.-led forces to commit to withdraw within a year. An overwhelming majority believes that the U.S. military presence in Iraq is provoking more conflict than it is preventing and there is growing confidence in the Iraqi army. If the United States made a commitment to withdraw, a majority believes that this would strengthen the Iraqi government. Support for attacks on U.S.-led forces has grown to a majority position—now six in ten. Support appears to be related to a widespread perception, held by all ethnic groups, that the U.S. government plans to have permanent military bases in Iraq.
The poll was conducted for WorldPublicOpinion.org by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland and was fielded by KA Research Ltd. / D3 Systems, Inc. Polling was carried out September 1-4 with a nationwide representative sample of 1,150 Iraqi adults, which included an oversample of 150 Arab Sunnis (hereafter simply called Sunnis).
A large majority of Iraqis—71%—say they would like the Iraqi government to ask for U.S.-led forces to be withdrawn from Iraq within a year or less. Given four options, 37 percent take the position that they would like U.S.-led forces withdrawn “within six months,” while another 34 percent opt for “gradually withdraw[ing] U.S.-led forces according to a one-year timeline.” Twenty percent favor a two-year timeline and just 9 percent favor “only reduc[ing] U.S.-led forces as the security situation improves in Iraq.”
There are significant variations between groups, though no group favors an open-ended commitment. Fifty-seven percent of Sunnis favor withdrawal in six months, with another 34 percent favoring it within a year. Shias are more evenly divided between six months (36%) and a year (38%). Few Shias favor two years (20%) or an open-ended commitment (5%). Only a third of Kurds favor withdrawal within a year or less, but two-thirds favor withdrawal within two years or less (11% six months, 24% one year, 34% two years). Thirty-one percent of Kurds favor an open-ended commitment.
As compared to January 2006, there has been, overall, a growing sense of urgency for withdrawal of U.S.-led forces. In January, respondents were only given three options—six months, two years, and an open-ended commitment. In September, the one-year option was added, since it had been nearly a year since the last time they were asked. While in January 70 percent favored withdrawal within two years (35% six months, 35% two years), now— approximately a year later—71 percent favor withdrawal within a year (37% six months, 34% one year). Support for an open-ended commitment has dropped from 29 percent to 9 percent.
Within ethnic groups there have been some shifts. Shias show a growing sense of urgency, with the numbers calling for withdrawal in six months rising from 22 percent to 36 percent. On the other hand, the Sunnis’ earlier overwhelming eagerness for withdrawal has moderated, with the percentage calling for withdrawal within six months dropping from 83 percent to 57 percent. Among those living in Baghdad, support is even lower at 24 percent. The sample size for this subgroup, however, is quite small and thus should be interpreted with caution. Still, 91 percent of Sunnis now say that they want the United States to withdraw within a year, including 84 percent of those in Baghdad.
PIPA director Steven Kull comments, “What we are seeing is a growing desire for U.S.-led forces to withdraw in the near future, greater confidence that the Iraqi army can deal with the situation, and continuing concern that the United States has no plans to ever leave.”
US Presence Seen as Having a Net Negative Effect
Support for a U.S. withdrawal appears to be derived from a widespread perception that the presence of U.S.-led forces is having a net negative effect on the situation in Iraq. Large numbers say that the United States' military presence is “provoking more conflict than it is preventing.” This view is held by 78 percent overall, and by 82 percent of Shias and a near-unanimous 97 percent of Sunnis. The Kurds diverge, with 56 percent taking the opposing view that the United States' military presence is “a stabilizing force.”
Among those who believe that the U.S. presence is provoking more conflict, 82 percent favor withdrawal of U.S. forces within a year. Among those who believe that it is a stabilizing force, just 33 percent favor withdrawal in this time frame.
More broadly, 79 percent of Iraqis say that the United States is having a negative influence on the situation in Iraq, with just 14 percent saying that it is having a positive influence. Views are especially negative among the Sunnis (96% negative), and the Shias (87% negative). However, a plurality of Kurds (48%) say that the United States is having a positive influence, while just 34 percent say its influence is negative.
Confidence in the U.S. military is quite low. Eighty-four percent say they have little (22%) or no (62%) confidence in the U.S. military. An extraordinary 98 percent of Sunnis take this view (no confidence 85%, a little 13%) as do 91 percent of Shias (no confidence 66%, a little 25%). However a majority of Kurds—55%—express confidence in the U.S. military (some 37%, a lot 18%), while 45 percent do not express confidence (no confidence 17%, a little 28%).
Commitment to Withdraw Seen as Strengthening Government
While many commentators have expressed concern that the withdrawal of U.S. forces would weaken or undermine the nascent Iraqi government, a modest majority of Iraqis believes that a commitment to withdraw would strengthen it. Asked, “If the US made a commitment to withdraw from Iraq according to a timetable, do you think this would strengthen the Iraqi government, weaken it, or have no effect either way?” 53 percent said that it would strengthen the government, while just 24 percent said it would weaken the government. Twenty-three percent believed that it would have no effect either way.
For all ethnic groups the belief that a commitment to withdraw would strengthen the government is the most common position, but it is more prevalent among the Shias (60%), than the Sunnis (46%) or Kurds (39%). The belief that it would weaken the government is held by just 18 percent of Shias, 24 percent of Sunnis and 37 percent of Kurds.
While it is not surprising that Iraqis may have enough confidence in the government to reject the idea that a U.S. commitment to withdraw militarily would weaken the government, it is not self-evident why the largest numbers would take the position that this would strengthen the government. It may be that the presence of U.S.-led forces—an ever-present reminder that the new Iraqi government does not exert full sovereignty—is perceived as undermining the government’s authority and legitimacy.
Growing Confidence in Iraqi Security Forces
Another factor that may be contributing to Iraqis' readiness to have U.S.-led forces leave is a growing confidence in Iraqi security forces. Asked to assess the readiness of Iraqi security forces to stand on their own in six months, 53 percent say that they “will be strong enough to deal with the security challenges Iraq will face” while 46 percent say they “will still need the help of military forces from other countries.”
When those who thought Iraqi security forces would still need the help of foreign forces in six months were asked how much longer they thought this help would be needed, 9 percent (of the total sample) said one year, 21 percent two years and 16 percent three years. Thus 62 percent overall believe that Iraqi security forces will be able to stand on their own in one year.
This level of confidence is up from January, when only 39 percent thought Iraqi forces would be strong enough in six months and 59 percent said they would still need foreign help.
The biggest part of this increase in confidence has come from Shias, 68 percent of whom now believe in the abilities of Iraqi forces—up from 45 percent in January. Confidence has grown among Kurds as well—up to 40 percent, from 22 percent in January, though 57 percent of Kurds still think foreign forces will be necessary. Sunnis, in contrast, express declining confidence in Iraqi security forces. Confidence has dropped from 38 percent to 24 percent—reflecting perhaps their dissatisfaction with the ability of Iraqi security forces to protect them from attacks, or their perception of infiltration by militia groups.
A large majority expresses confidence in the Iraqi army. Sixty-four percent say they have some (40%) or a lot (24%) of confidence in the army. Interestingly, Kurds express the most confidence with 79 percent saying they have some or a lot of confidence, followed by the Shias (65%). Even 46 percent of Sunnis express confidence, though more (54%) have little or no confidence.
Attacks on U.S.-Led Forces
Support for attacks against U.S.-led forces has increased sharply to 61 percent (27% strongly, 34% somewhat). This represents a 14-point increase from January 2006, when only 47 percent of Iraqis supported attacks.
This change is due primarily to a dramatic 21-point increase among Shias, whose approval of attacks has risen from 41 percent in January to 62 percent in September. A very large majority (86%) of Kurds disapprove of attacks (59% strongly), with only 15 percent supporting them. Kurdish disapproval is up slightly from January, when it was 81 percent, but approval of attacks has held constant. Similarly, Sunni support for attacks has remained relatively constant with 92 percent approving (up only slightly from 88% in January).
Though Sunnis still overwhelmingly approve of attacks, the intensity of their support has moderated somewhat. The percentage saying that they approve of attacks strongly has dropped from 77 percent in January to 55 percent today. This may be related to the decline (mentioned above) in the size of the Sunni majority calling for withdrawal of U.S.-led forces in six months.
Belief that the United States Plans Permanent Bases in Iraq
Naturally the question arises: If only one in three Iraqis favors a U.S. withdrawal in the shortest possible time frame of six months, why then is support for attacks on U.S.-led forces as high as 61 percent? Indeed, among those who approve of such attacks, only 50 percent favor withdrawal in six months—though another 37 percent favor it in a year.
It is always difficult to know why people have certain attitudes, but some findings are strongly suggestive. A large majority of Iraqis—and a majority in all ethnic groups—believes that the United States plans to maintain permanent military bases in Iraq and would not withdraw its forces if asked to by the Iraqi government. Among those who support attacks on U.S.-led forces this belief is especially high, while most of those who do not support such attacks believe the United States would withdraw if asked. This suggests that some Iraqis approve of such attacks, not because they want the U.S.-led forces to get out immediately, but because they want to put pressure on the United States to get out eventually.
Asked whether they think “the U.S. government plans to have permanent military bases in Iraq or to remove all its military forces once Iraq is stabilized,” 77 percent of respondents say that the United States plans to have permanent military bases. This view is held by a majority of Kurds (58%), as well as Shias (73%) and virtually all Sunnis (97%).
Perhaps more significant, approximately the same number—78%—believe that “If the new Iraqi government were to tell the United States to withdraw all of its forces within six months,” the United States would refuse to do so. Again, this view is held by a majority of all groups—64 percent of Kurds, 76 percent of Shias and 96 percent of Sunnis.
The belief that the United States plans to have permanent bases in Iraq is highly correlated with support for attacks on U.S.-led forces. Among those who believe this, 68 percent approve of attacks. Among those who believe that the United States plans to withdraw once Iraq is stabilized, only 34 percent approve of attacks. Beliefs about whether the United States would respond to an Iraqi government request to withdraw follow the same pattern.
There is also some evidence that if the United States were to make a commitment to withdraw according to a timetable, support for attacks would diminish. The 61 percent who said they approved of attacks were asked: “If the United States made a commitment to withdraw from Iraq according to a timetable, would you feel less supportive of attacks against US-led forces or would it make no difference?” Most of these—36% (of the full sample)—said that they would feel less supportive, while 23 percent said it would make no difference. Those saying they would feel less supportive included 43 percent of the Shias and 42 percent of the Sunnis.
Non-military Forms of US Involvement
Majorities still approve of U.S. efforts to train Iraqi security forces and help with community development, though most feel the United States is doing a poor job. However, a modest majority now disapproves of the United States helping to mediate between ethnic groups. Were the United States to agree to a timetable for the withdrawal of its forces Iraqis say their support for nonmilitary forms of U.S. involvement in Iraq would increase.
Almost two-thirds (63%) continue to approve of the United States training Iraqi security forces, though most of these (41% of the full sample) think the United States is doing a poor job. Support is especially high among Shias (64%) and Kurds (93%) though only 19 percent of Shias say the United States is doing a good job, as compared to 50 percent of Kurds. Sixty-four percent of Sunnis are opposed to the United States being involved in this way.
Support has eroded somewhat from January, when 77 percent approved. The biggest change has come from Shias, whose support has dropped a sharp 25 points from 89 percent—perhaps part of a growing orientation to U.S. disengagement. Interestingly, opposition among Sunnis has dropped 10 points from 74 percent—consistent with a general softening of intense opposition to all things American. The Kurds’ strong support is unchanged.
A larger majority (68%) approves of the United States “helping Iraqis organize their communities to address local needs such as building schools and health clinics.” But here again most of these—41% (of the full sample)—believes that the United States is doing a poor job. Here too support is strongest among Shias (71%) and Kurds (87%). Fifty-nine percent of Sunnis are opposed.
A striking shift has occurred in regard to the United States “helping to mediate between ethnic groups.” While in January 65 percent approved of such U.S. involvement, this has dropped sharply to 47 percent, with 52 percent disapproving. Furthermore, only 8 percent believe the United States is doing a good job.
The biggest change occurred among Shias, with support dropping from 76 percent to 43 percent and opposition rising from 24 percent to 57 percent. But here again, Sunni opposition has softened from 81 percent to 70 percent. Kurdish support has been largely stable, now at 83 percent.
It appears that if the United States were to make a commitment to withdraw, support for nonmilitary forms of U.S. involvement would increase. Those that expressed disapproval of any of the forms of nonmilitary involvement (65% of the sample) were asked, “If the United States were to agree to a timetable for withdrawing its forces, would that make you more likely to approve of the United States being involved in Iraq in these nonmilitary ways, or would it make no difference?” More than half of this group (37% of the full sample) said that it would make them more likely to approve of nonmilitary forms of U.S. involvement, while 27 percent said it would make no difference.
Majorities of All Iraqi Ethnic Groups Want Strong Central Government
Six in Ten Approve Maliki’s Government, Though Optimism Down
Full Report
Questionnaire/Methodology
Transcript of Brookings Saban Center Event
Reports of conflict in Iraq may give the impression that the central government is so weak and unpopular that Iraq is on the verge of fragmenting into a loose confederation, and that major sectors of the population are aligning themselves with militias. However, the findings of a new WPO poll of Iraqis suggest a different picture.
Iraqis appear to agree on having a strong central government, and large majorities among all ethnic groups (Shias, Arab Sunnis, and Kurds) want the government to get rid of the militias. Majorities of all groups do not favor a movement toward a looser confederation and believe that five years from now Iraq will still be a single state. Six in ten approve of the job the Maliki government is doing in facing Iraq’s problems—though currently, a slight majority does not think Iraq is going in the right direction.
The poll was conducted for WorldPublicOpinion.org by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland and was fielded by KA Research Ltd. / D3 Systems, Inc. Polling was conducted September 1-4 with a nationwide representative sample of 1,150 Iraqi adults.
The militias appear to be quite unpopular and very large majorities of all groups favor a strong government that would get rid of the militias. Just 21 percent overall—and a minority of all groups—say that they think “it would be better to continue to have militias to protect [their] security.” Rather, 77 percent overall say that they would “prefer to have a strong government that would get rid of all militias.” This view is held by 82 percent of Kurds, 65 percent of Shias and an extraordinary 100 percent of Sunnis. 
Iraqis appear to agree on having a strong central government rather than changing the present system in favor of a looser confederation. Asked whether “the new Iraqi system of government grants the central government too much power, too little power, or about the right amount of power,” only 37 percent overall say that it grants too much power. The group with the largest percentage holding this view is the Sunnis, but still this is a minority of 46 percent. Overall 61 percent say that the central government is granted too little power (35%) or about the right amount of power (26%). Interestingly, the Kurds have the highest percentage (42%) saying that the central government has too little power.
Iraqis also express confidence that Iraq will survive as a single state. Asked, “How likely do you think it is that five years from now Iraq will still be a single state?” 72 percent overall say that it is very (30%) or somewhat likely (42%), while just 28 percent say it is not very likely (24%) or not at all likely (4%). Majorities of all groups express this confidence, including 80 percent of Shias, 65 percent of Kurds, and 56 percent of Sunnis. 
Most Iraqis (65%) see the current Iraqi government as “the legitimate representative of the Iraqi people.” However, while 82 percent of Shias and 76 percent of Kurds feel this way, 86 percent of Sunnis do not.
Confidence in Government and Security Forces
Despite Iraq’s troubles, a large majority expresses confidence in the government led by Prime Minister Nouri Maliki. Sixty-three percent say that “in its effort to deal with Iraq’s problems,” the government is doing a very good job (17%) or a somewhat good job (46%).
Large majorities also express confidence in the Iraqi government forces’ ability to protect their security. As mentioned above, 64 percent say they have some (40%) or a lot (24%) of confidence in the Iraqi army. Though controversy has swirled around Interior Ministry forces, they fare only a little less well, with 62 percent expressing some (34%) or a lot (28%) of confidence. For the police, 71 percent express some (34%) or a lot (37%) of confidence.
Perhaps most significantly, when asked, “Do you feel that if all militias were to disarm now, that you could or could not rely on the government alone to ensure security in your area?” a large 68 percent say they feel they could.
Complex Sunni Attitudes
While Shias and Kurds are similar in their confidence in Iraqi security forces and approval of the performance of the Maliki government, Sunnis express more complex attitudes. On one hand, a large 93 percent say that if all the militias were to disarm, they could rely on the government to ensure their security, and a striking 100 percent would “prefer to have a strong government that would get rid of all militias.”
On the other hand, Sunnis express low confidence in the Iraqi government and its security institutions. Eighty-two percent say that the Maliki government is doing a bad job. Seventy-six percent say that they have no confidence at all in the Iraqi Interior Ministry forces (often reputed to be a Shia stronghold) and 77 percent express little or no confidence that the police protect their security. The only institution that that engenders a bit of confidence is the army (perhaps because it is under a Sunni defense minister). Forty-six percent of Sunnis say they have at least some confidence in the army, though 54 percent say they have little or no confidence.
It appears that Sunnis support a strong central government in principle and would like to see the government get rid of the militias, most of which pose a threat to the Sunnis. At the same time, the dominance of Shias in the government, and especially its security institutions, do not engender full confidence in Sunnis that they will be protected.
General Optimism Down
The conflict and instability in Iraq has taken its toll. A majority of Shias (59%) and Kurds (64%) continue to say that the country is going in the right direction, but these numbers are down sharply from January when 84 percent of Shias and 76 percent of Kurds expressed optimism. Combined with the unchanged 93 percent of Sunnis saying that the country is going in the wrong direction, a slight majority of Iraqis (52%) now say that the country is headed in the wrong direction—one of the highest recorded in a long series of polls asking this question.
Majorities of all ethnic groups believe that six months from now the level of violence will be the same or higher than it is today. Overall, 31 percent expect the violence to be about the same and 30 percent expect it to be higher; only 38 percent think it will go down. Sunnis are the most pessimistic, with only 23 percent believing that the violence will go down and 43 percent assuming that it will rise.
Ousting Saddam Hussein
A majority of Iraqis (61%) still believe that ousting Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships, but this is down from the 77 percent who said this in January. Among Shias, the majority saying getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth it has slipped from 98 percent to 75 percent, while among the Kurds it has dropped from 91 percent to 81 percent. The number of Sunnis saying it was not worth it has drifted upward from 83 percent to 89 percent, with only 11 percent saying that it was worth it.
Attacks on Iraqis
Attacks on government security forces and civilians continue to be rejected by very large majorities of all groups. There are differing perceptions of the source of such attacks. The majority of Sunnis think that attacks on Sunni civilians mainly come from other Iraqis, while Shias and Kurds believe they come from foreign fighters. A majority of all groups agree that attacks on Shias mostly come from foreign fighters. Majorities of all groups believe that the violence against ethnic groups is intended to drive them from their neighborhoods, so that a militia can solidify its power.
Attacks on government security forces and civilians continue to be rejected by overwhelming majorities of all groups, just as they were in January. Ninety-six percent disapprove of attacks on Iraqi government security forces, and 68 percent disapprove strongly. One hundred percent disapprove of attacks on civilians (97% strongly).
Sunnis are a little less emphatic in their opposition to attacks on Iraqi security forces: while 86 percent disapprove, only 29 percent disapprove strongly. Fourteen percent approve somewhat of these attacks, but only 1 percent express strong approval. However, Sunnis are no different in their total opposition to attacks on civilians, with 99 percent disapproving (95% strongly).
Respondents were asked in two separate questions whether they thought attacks on Sunni civilians, and on Shia civilians, mainly come from foreign fighters or from other Iraqis. When it came to attacks on Sunni civilians, the majority of Sunnis (69%) thought the attacks mainly came from other Iraqis—presumably by Shia death squads. However, the majority of Shias (63%) thought these attacks were primarily coming from foreign fighters, and a modest majority of Kurds (52%) agreed.
When it came to attacks on Shia civilians, a majority of Shia (57%) thought that the attacks were primarily coming from foreign fighters. A large majority of Kurds (63%) and a modest majority of Sunnis (53%) agreed. This perception may be influenced by claims al Qaeda in Iraq has made about attacks on Shias.
Majorities of all groups believe that the intent of violence against ethnic groups is to drive them from their neighborhoods, so that a militia can solidify its power. Overall, two-thirds (67%) ascribed “some” (39%) or “most” (28%) of the violence against ethnic groups to this purpose; 76 percent of Shias, 56 percent of Sunnis, and 52 percent of Kurds held this view.
Views of Shia Leaders
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is the only major Shia leader with appeal that reaches beyond his own ethnic group. Fifty-eight percent of Kurds view him favorably, as do 86 percent of Shias (45% very). However, an overwhelming 85 percent of Sunnis view him unfavorably (48% very).
Though Grand Ayatollah Sistani and Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr are at odds with each other on the direction of Iraq, they both get overwhelming support from Shias. Sistani is seen favorably by 95 percent of Shias (77% very), while Muqtada al Sadr is viewed favorably by 81 percent (52% very).
However, neither are viewed favorably by Kurds or Sunnis. Sistani is viewed unfavorably by 78 percent of Kurds (39% very) and 95 percent of Sunnis (50% very). Muqtada al Sadr is viewed unfavorably by 94 percent of Kurds (75% very) and 91 percent of Sunnis (80% very).
All Iraqi Ethnic Groups Overwhelmingly Reject al Qaeda
But Groups Vary on Iran, Syria, Hezbollah
Full Report
Questionnaire/Methodology
Transcript of Brookings Saban Center Event
A new poll of Iraqis shows that al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden are rejected by overwhelming majorities of Shias and Kurds and large majorities of Sunnis.
Shias have mildly positive views of Iran and its President, while Kurds and Sunnis have strongly negative views. Shias and Kurds have mostly negative views of Syria, while Sunnis are mildly positive. Shias have overwhelmingly positive views of Hezbollah, while Kurds and Sunnis have negative views.
The poll was conducted for WorldPublicOpinion.org by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland and was fielded by KA Research Ltd. / D3 Systems, Inc. A nationwide representative sample of 1,150 Iraqi adults was surveyed September 1-4.
It may be easy to assume that as the Iraqi people become more supportive of attacks on U.S.-led forces (see WPO main article), they may grow warmer toward al Qaeda—the probable source of a significant number of attacks on U.S. forces. However, this does not appear to be the case. Al Qaeda is exceedingly unpopular among the Iraqi people.
Overall 94 percent have an unfavorable view of al Qaeda, with 82 percent expressing a very unfavorable view. Of all organizations and individuals assessed in this poll, it received the most negative ratings. The Shias and Kurds show similarly intense levels of opposition, with 95 percent and 93 percent respectively saying they have very unfavorable views. The Sunnis are also quite negative, but with less intensity. Seventy-seven percent express an unfavorable view, but only 38 percent are very unfavorable. Twenty-three percent express a favorable view (5% very).
Views of Osama bin Laden are only slightly less negative. Overall 93 percent have an unfavorable view, with 77 percent very unfavorable. Very unfavorable views are expressed by 87 percent of Kurds and 94 percent of Shias. Here again, the Sunnis are negative, but less unequivocally—71 percent have an unfavorable view (23% very), and 29 percent a favorable view (3% very).
Regional Actors: Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah
Some observers fear that with the ascension of Shias to a dominant role in Iraq, there is potential for the formation of an alliance between Iraq and Shia-dominated Iran. In this poll, though, Shias show only mildly positive attitudes toward Iran, while Kurds and Sunnis are quite negative. Asked whether Iran is having a mostly positive or negative influence on the situation in Iraq, just 45 percent of Shias say it is having a positive influence (negative 28%, neutral 27%), while Iran’s influence is viewed as mostly negative by large majorities of Kurds (71%) and Sunnis (94%).
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad does a bit better among Shias, with 64 percent having a very (28%) or somewhat (36%) favorable view. But Kurds have a largely unfavorable view (very 43%, somewhat 34%) and the Sunnis an exceedingly unfavorable view (very 80%, somewhat 17%).
While some have expressed fears of Syria being a link in an emerging Shia crescent (though very few Syrians are Shia), public opinion in Iraq would hardly be the cement. Most Shias (68%) think Syria is having a negative influence on Iraq’s situation, as do most Kurds (63%). Sunnis are only mildly positive, with 41 percent having a favorable view (17% negative, 43% neutral).
Hezbollah elicits highly polarized views. An overwhelming 91 percent of Shias have a very (50%) or somewhat favorable (41%) view of Hezbollah, while an equally large 93 percent of Kurds have a very (64%) or somewhat (29%) unfavorable view. Sunnis are also fairly negative, with 59 percent having a very (10%) or somewhat (49%) unfavorable view.