Full Report

Both the Israeli and Palestinian publics want to reach a peace agreement, but both sides deeply distrust the other and are pessimistic that negotiations will soon resolve their conflict. Negotiators on both sides also are constrained by extremists opposed to major Israeli-Palestinian compromises - Hamas which favors a posture of "resistance" to Israel, and the Israeli settler movement which opposes yielding territory or settlements to the Palestinians.

One of the most telling measures of the Israeli and Palestinian publics' mutual desire for an accord - besides both sides predominant support of the Middle East peace process - are their attitudes toward a U.S. mediating role. Both Israelis and Palestinians mainly favor a stronger U.S. role in the peace process, because the U.S. is seen as a key to reaching an agreement, even though each side perceives the U.S. as partial to the other. There is a growing consensus among Middle East observers that the United States will have to present Israeli and Palestinian negotiators with a two-state peace plan, including at least the basic parameters for resolving the most critical issues - borders/settlements, Jerusalem/Holy Sites, security arrangements and refugees/compensation.

Among the various issues dividing Israelis and Palestinians, the future of Jerusalem appears to be the most difficult to resolve: Not only is the issue of Jerusalem ranked a high priority by both publics - and therefore relatively difficult ground on which to make concessions - but also each proposal tested to resolve this issue was predominantly opposed by both Israelis and Palestinians. These findings are based on analyses of several sets of simultaneous, dual-sample surveys of the Israeli and Palestinian publics taken in 2009 and 2010 which measured support for more than two dozen specific proposals covering eight major issues.

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An abridged version of the following article appeared in Politico. It includes some newly released poll findings that can be viewed here.

Conventional wisdom is that the political pendulum has swung away from the Democrats--driven by a fierce reaction to a "Big Government" agenda. This spawned the tea party movement. But the story is not so simple.

Polls do show that the tea party is striking a chord with many Americans. In fact, 52 percent of Americans feel sympathy with the tea party movement, according to a new poll from WorldPublicOpinion.org.

But it does not appear that this sympathetic response is connected to the tea party's warning about Big Government. Only 31 percent of tea party sympathizers say their main concern is that government "is becoming too big." Rather, 55 percent say their greater concern is that the government "is not following the will of the people."

Even among the hard core who say that they are very sympathetic to the tea party--one in five overall--only 46 percent cite major concerns about Big Government. More of this group, 47 percent, express greater concern about the lack of democratic responsiveness.

Speakers at tea party rallies regularly invoke the theme that the government is not responding to the will of the people and claim the mantle of representing the people in defiance of the government's failure to respond. Sarah Palin, at the climax of one speech, said, "This movement is about the people. ... Remember, all political power is inherent in the people, and government is supposed to be working for the people."

Justin Graber echoed, "When it's [House Speaker] Nancy Pelosi and [Senate Majority Leader] Harry Reid vs. the will of the American people, America is on our side."

These messages resonate. In the new WPO poll, 83 percent of the general public says that the will of the people should have more influence than it does. Those very sympathetic to the tea party are even higher -- at 95 percent. Asked whether "this country is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or for the benefit of all the people," 81 percent of Americans say it is run by big interests; as do 90 percent of the strong sympathizers.

From a political perspective, what really matters is how the tea party message is reaching beyond the Republican base. This reach is substantial.
Among those who are sympathetic to the tea party, only 39 percent are firmly Republican. The remaining 61 percent include those who lean Republican (15 percent), are independents (20 percent), lean Democratic (6 percent), or are firmly Democratic (20 percent).

Among these non-Republican tea party sympathizers, just 23 percent say they are primarily concerned about Big Government, while 59 percent say they are more concerned about the government being unresponsive to the people.

Yet there is little evidence that most Americans have turned to the Republican model of small government. A recent Washington Post poll asked, "Which party do you think has better ideas about the right size and role of the federal government?" A plurality chose the Democratic Party (45 percent) over the Republican Party (40 percent).

At the same time, there is political danger here for the Democrats. When the electorate is feeling frustrated that the government is not being responsive, it puts them in a mood hostile to incumbents -- who right now are largely Democrats. It makes them want to reshuffle the deck in hope of getting a better hand.

President Barack Obama was elected on a wave of hope that his administration would change Washington dynamics. There is a growing sense now that, in key ways, the new bums are the same as the old bums.

The Obama administration seems to understand the need to convince the public that they are truly listening and responding. With some fanfare, the White House established an Office of Public Engagement to do just that.

But, while this office's website lists some interesting activities, which may appeal to the tiny sliver of the public who knows it exists, it has had little effect. WPO asked how much influence the people's will has on the government, on a scale of 0 to 10: The mean response was 3.8 -- no better than the rating President George W. Bush got in a 2008 poll. Asked how much influence the people should have, the mean response was 7.5.

Further, asked how well elected officials in the Federal Government understand the views of most Americans, 67 percent said "not that well" (42 percent) or "not well at all" (25 percent).

To move the needle on the perception of responsiveness is likely to require going to scale in a way that is highly visible to the U.S. electorate.

It has to move well beyond the scale of the Office of Public Engagement. It should also move beyond focusing on the tiny fraction of the public who self-select to express their views. To give voice to the public, it is necessary to scientifically select a representative sample of Americans -- just as is done in a standard poll.

Some people in Washington have the impression that the American public have a negative view of policymakers paying attention to polls and thus would not like the idea of anything that involves such a sampling process. This is a major misperception. Even when presented the argument that "when government leaders are thinking about an important decision" they "should not pay attention to public opinion polls because this will distract them from deciding what they think is right," eight in ten rejected it in favor of the argument that government leaders should pay attention to polls.

But this does not mean that most Americans think that the government should mechanically follow the results of polls, especially when it comes to matters that involve complex information that may not available to most Americans. What an overwhelming number of Americans do agree on (84 percent in the most recent WPO poll) is that "The goal of Congress should be to make the decisions that the majority of Americans would make if they had the information and time to think things over that Congress has."
Around the country there have been numerous experiments in which representative samples of Americans have been given in-depth and balanced information on public policy issues. In some cases these are conducted over the internet, while in others people are briefed in person and engage in discussions. Finally their views are aggregated and reported to government leaders.

Americans express great enthusiasm for these kinds of processes. They have confidence in the American public and think that government decisions would be better if they were informed by the results of such processes.

Naturally, there is some risk here. Were the administration to take these kinds of processes to scale and really give the citizenry as a whole a voice, it might not always say what the administration wants to hear.

But only when this is done will Americans really have confidence that they are being heard. And until they have such confidence, they are likely to continue to lurch between the parties and applaud the strident messages of groups like the tea party, looking for leaders who will realize the democratic ideals that they learned in school, and despite their disappointments in many elected leaders, still take to heart.

Steven Kull, a political psychologist, is director of WorldPublicOpinion.org and the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland.

This article was originally published in the Spring | Summer 2010 issue of Kosmos Journal

When we look at world conditions and project current trends into the future we see much that is disturbing--environmental degradation, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, persisting poverty and injustice, violent conflict, the fiscal collapse of democratic governments.The institutions that have the greatest power--nation states, corporations, and organized interest groups--seem locked in patterns of self-interested behavior such that the necessary changes are hard to imagine.

Yet when we look to the past we see that there have been remarkable evolutionary changes--the emergence of democracy, the abolition of slavery, universally recognized principles of the rights of women and minorities, concern for the environment, international laws against aggressive wars and significant efforts by thosein wealthy nations to address global poverty. During the run-up to these changes they too surely seemed unimaginable.

So what is it that brings about such shifts?...

Read more (PDF)

This paper was first presented at the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy's 11th Annual Conference on April 28, 2010

Over the last six years I have been conducting a major study of public opinion in the Muslim world. This study included conducting focus groups in six majority Muslim countries and numerous surveys in ten of them, including all of the major ones. It also included a comprehensive analysis of surveys conducted by other organizations.

It will not surprise you to hear that there is quite a lot of anger toward America in the Muslim world. This predated the Bush administration but intensified after the Iraq war.

With the election of Barack Obama there has been substantial hope that views of the US would improve, just as they have in other parts of the world, especially in the wake of the Cairo speech. There have been some improvements, particularly in Egypt itself. Majorities in several majority Muslim countries, including Egypt, have said that they think Obama respects Islam.

But the basic problem of anger at America still largely exists. Majorities in most Muslim countries continue to have a negative view of the US and to perceive the US as seeking to dominate the Muslim world, to undermine Islam and to impose Western culture. Though Obama seems to personally hold some appeal, he is still seen as party to these negative American efforts. In a WPO poll conducted in 2009 in various Muslim countries polled, only small minorities endorsed the view that "In our government's relations with the US... the US more often treats us fairly" while majorities said the US "abuses its greater power to make us do what the US wants."

Some have speculated that roots of Muslim anger at America lie in a clash of civilizations between Muslim and the West, that Muslims are simply opposed to liberal values of democracy, pluralism and human rights. Muslims largely reject this view. Numerous polls that we have conducted as well, as well as others by the World Values Survey and Arab Barometer, show strong support throughout the Muslim world for democracy, for human rights, and for an international order based on international law and a strong United Nations.

These surveys do however suggest that there is a kind of internal clash of civilizations or at least some tension of civilizations. For example while large majorities support the principle that will of the people should be the basis of authority for government; majorities also support the notion that shari'a should be the basis for government and that a group of Islamic scholars should be able to vet laws.

As people in this auditorium are well aware, there are many scholars in the Muslim world who are working to develop frameworks for integrating these two various elements into a coherent framework. Some may even feel that conceptually this problem is solved.

But looking at polling data and the way that people behave in focus groups, we do see people responding with inconsistencies and apparent stress. Clearly, assimilating liberal values while preserving Islamic identity is difficult for many Muslims. Furthermore, there are strong reasons to believe that this process of integration has been disrupted and subverted by tensions between the Muslim world and the US, as well as tensions between al Qaeda and the US.

A recurring narrative in focus groups and in polls is that the US has put forward the liberal ideals of democracy and national sovereignty and then effectively abandoned those principles by promoting undemocratic governments in the Muslim world. Thus Muslims feel betrayed by the US.

Naturally Muslims ask, 'why does the US promote democracy in other parts of the world, but not here?' This leads them to two key answers. One is that the US is fundamentally hostile to Islam and thus it does not trust Muslim people with democracy. Second, that the US is so obsessed with its drive for oil that it is ready to ignore its principles.

This leads to the superimposition of yet another narrative. According to this view all that the US says about liberal values is just a subterfuge to get Muslims to lower their guard. Rather, the US is simply an imperial western power that seeks to coercively dominate the Muslim world. US military forces in Muslim countries are seen as threatening and imposing America's will. Here is an example from a focus group in Egypt.

M: How do you feel about the US military bases in the region, especially in the Gulf region?
- R1: We don't like it...The existence of US military bases in any Arab country represents a threat to the Egyptian national security
- M: Let me see a show of hands, how many people sitting here perceive the US military bases as a threat to Egypt? [most raise hands] Why?
- R1: ...These bases are there... to attack us... we'll never trust the Americans
R2: The US is trying to influence things in Egypt...The military bases represent occupation of the Arab world again...
- R3: If it wants to control this area [the Arab world]... [The US must] have military forces ready to take military against any government in an Arab country that would react in a manner that is not in the US's interests.
- M: So, the military bases of the US are there to threaten the countries in the region that do not do what America wants them to do....
- R3: Of course.
M: Does everyone here agree with this? [general agreement]

Al Qaeda has been effective in elaborating this narrative, portraying the US as continuous with the Crusaders. While most Muslims have many reservations about al Qaeda, most do resonate with the narrative that al Qaeda puts forward. In polls, large majorities in numerous countries say they agree with al Qaeda's goals to keep Western values out of the Muslim world and to get the US to remove all its forces from the Muslim world.

So what has happened here? From a psychological perspective, the underlying tension that Muslims feel between their competing desires to assimilate liberal values and to preserve their Muslim identity has become externalized in the form of a conflict between the Muslim people and America.

This is problematic in a variety of ways. It strengthens radical Islamists, such as al Qaeda, who assert that there is no middle way; that to preserve Islam, the infidels, and all nontraditional ideas, must be forcefully driven out. Given that Islam itself at risk, they argue, every possible measure must be taken including the killing of civilians. Most Muslim think killing civilians is contrary to Islam, but still they do concur with the larger narrative of defending Islam against America and this lowers their resistance to al Qaeda.

Just as important, once the dialectical relation between traditional Islam and liberal ideas becomes projected onto the external conflict with the US, this interrupts the process of integration in the general society by shifting the focus away from the central process.

So what can the US do? Naturally any steps that the US takes will disrupt the status quo. Some may prefer the devil they know. Others may be pretty tired of it. But let us consider the options should the US want to change the current dynamic.

First, the US would need to take steps to diffuse the image of the US as coercively controlling the Muslim world. It may come as something of a surprise to Americans that many Muslims feel that the US controls most of what happens in the Muslim world. One can debate about whether this is actually true. But the perception is nonetheless there and can sometimes take extreme forms.

One of the reasons people have this perception is the extent of the US military footprint. It is not illogical for people to look around and ask, "Who has most of the military power?" and assume that that party is in control. Anything the US can do to lighten this footprint is likely to help reduce the impression of American domination.

Another possibility is for the US to refrain from the use of implied threats. Whenever the US says that 'all options are on the table,' it is heard as a threat to use military force to achieve American ends.

Yet another possibility is for the US to clearly state that it does not have a claim to other nations' oil and that it respects the territorial rights of Middle East governments. Apparently, some people have interpreted the Carter Doctrine to mean that the US is committed to preserving access irrespective of the wishes of host governments. Naturally, this offends Muslims' sense of dignity as well as challenges their sovereignty.

But perhaps the most fundamental step the US could take would to be trust the Muslim people with democracy. Polls show that a major source of Muslim anger at America is its perceived opposition to democracy in the Muslim world.

This perception of America as not trusting the Muslim people with democracy is the flip side of the perception of the US as seeking to control the Muslim world. A failure to trust the Muslim people is perceived as, and logically leads to, an effort to control. To convince Muslims that it is not trying to control them, the US must convince them that it trusts them.

This is not something that can be faked. Ultimately the US must make a decision about whether to trust the Muslim people to determine their fate--a decision that has not been clearly made.

One may argue that the Muslim people have to earn America's trust. But this is not likely to happen under the current circumstances. Muslims find this notion both insulting and inconsistent with liberal principles, just as Americans would. They believe that self-determination is a right, not something that has to be earned.

Muslims conclude that American posture is driven by a mistrust of what the Muslim people might decide, in particular that they might decide to create an Islamist state. It is not hard to see how this is seen as an expression of fundamentally ant-Islamic attitudes in the US leadership.

So what it would mean to trust the Muslim people? Lacing diplomatic communications with references to the rights of Muslim people to democracy and self-determination would make a difference. When George W. Bush spoke in 2005 of a renewed commitment to democracy it had strong repercussions throughout the Muslim world.

Perhaps the most concrete change that would be called for would be for the US to change its stance toward moderate Islamist parties. While Islamist parties get mixed reviews among Muslim publics, large majorities see such parties as legitimate players in the political process. America's suspicious and standoffish stance toward many of them, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, has contributed significantly to the perception that the US is anti-Islamic and denies Muslims the right to self-determination. Refusing to grant visas to highly regarded scholars who endorse Islamist ideas, even when they are also explicitly pro-democratic and anti-terrorist, is seen as discriminatory.

The Obama administration has largely continued the cool posture toward the Muslim Brotherhood of earlier administrations. When Obama spoke in Cairo in June 2009, he reportedly invited members of the Muslim Brotherhood to the speech. However in the speech itself, he implicitly reiterated the long-standing suspicion that Islamist groups attempting to participate in the democratic political process, would revert to authoritarianism once in office. At one point he curiously shifted to speaking in second person, as if he were addressing specific individuals in the lecture hall and said:

...you must maintain your power through consent, not coercion; you must respect the rights of minorities, and participate with a spirit of tolerance and compromise.

Many Muslims, as well as members of the Muslim Brotherhood, find such comments frustrating. There are no cases when an Islamist party was elected through a democratic process and then became undemocratic. Thus, moderate Islamists may well feel that they are being treated as guilty until proven innocent. When Islamism, not violent radicalism, is targeted, then Islam itself appears to be the real target.

Finally in closing, I want to read from a transcript of a focus group. One may ask whether Muslim views of the US are so entrenched that there is little the US can do to affect them.

In the focus groups, people do say that in the past they felt that a warmth toward America and for its democratic ideals. The question is whether such feelings can reemerge.

In February 2008, I conducted a focus group in Pakistan just a few days after the election in which Pervez Musharraf was unseated. There was an interesting exchange in which some members of the focus group were first repeating standard statements about how America controls everything in Pakistan seemingly ignoring the results of the election. One said:

These orders that we get from the US, in my opinion, are all pre-planned and since it is such a powerful country, it can pressurize us into following their orders. For example they are so powerful that they can enforce or threaten people into voting for Musharraf.

Perplexed, I asked him, "Do you think the outcome of the elections is what America wanted?" With a slightly pugnacious tone, he answered, "Yes it's possible."

I then turned to the group and asked, "Do all of you feel that way?" There was an awkward pause and finally a respondent said:

No, I don't feel that way. Previously I thought that all the elections were influenced by America. However, this time around I was in charge of one of the polling stations and discovered that what America wants doesn't necessarily always happen and in fact what the people want happens. The policy should be according to the needs of the people.

Once again there was an uncomfortable silence. I persisted in asking others, "How many of you think that the outcome of the elections was something that America wanted? Please raise your hands." Only two did. Another respondent came forward and said,

America wants that democracy in Pakistan to be strong and for the people to progress. America doesn't want people to come and attack them.

This paper was first presented on May 14th, 2010 at the Center for International Security Studies Second Annual Symposium at Princeton University

As the stress of two wars combines with after-affects of a deep recession and a global financial crisis that keeps unfolding new chapters, many observers have expressed concern that the American public will be increasingly unwilling to shoulder the burden of America's unique world position of leadership.

These concerns were sharply evoked last December by a major study on attitudes toward foreign policy from the Pew Research Center. This poll included a number of long-standing trend line questions that are often seen as a measure of isolationism. These showed a sharp movement that has been widely interpreted as a surge of isolationism. However even the same poll also showed support for various forms of international engagement. So that the story is not as simple as was reported.

Stated briefly I think there are some signs that the public is feeling overextended and would like to lighten the burden of America's role in the world. This has actually been true for sometime, but it has been significantly exacerbated by the economic crisis and the effect of conducting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They feel the pressure of the budget deficit--something that concerns them.

However, I do not think that this should be interpreted as a simple move toward isolationism. In response to poll questions that pose only two response options--basically for the US to disengage or not--we see some signs of an increasing desire to disengage.

But when given more response options, we find more complex response. There is a clear preference for a reducing America's dominant role. But there is also clear support for the US to stay engaged in the world, though in a less hegemonic and more cooperative form even if this means relinquishing some control.

So what are the findings that suggest that Americans are increasingly looking to disengage?

Asked by Pew whether they agreed or disagreed that "The U.S. should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own," for the first time in more than 40 years of polling, a plurality of 49% agreed with this position.

Questions that ask people to prioritize problems at home over problems abroad have always found majorities putting a higher priority on problems at home. But this majority has become larger. A new high of 76% agreed that "We should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home."

Seventy-three percent want the president to focus on domestic policy more than on foreign policy. Again, this is commonly a majority preference, but 73% is the largest such majority since 1997.

At this point there are no data showing a desire to cut US defense spending. However there are reasons to believe that as the problem of the deficit gains greater prominence over the next few years, that we will see greater pressure to reduce defense spending.

Based on a poll that we did in 2005 a few years ago it appears that as people get more information about the proportion of the budget devoted to defense spending, their desire to cut it will increase substantially. At that time, poll questions that simply asked whether people wanted to increase, decrease or maintain defense spending did not find a majority wanting to cut it.

In a poll we conducted in 2005 we included a budget exercise in which we presented respondents the discretionary budget broken down into 16 key areas and gave them the opportunity to redistribute it as they saw fit, including the opportunity to redirect funds toward deficit reduction. In this context, the average respondent cut defense spending 31%. Sixty-eight percent of respondents made cuts to defense.

It is likely that in the near future, as the struggle over the budget deficit gains prominence, that information about the distribution of the budget will become more visible. This will likely to generate some downward pressures on the defense budget.

It is also important to note that in this same poll, even without the information about the actual distribution, when respondents were presented the possibility of cutting defense in favor of education, healthcare, housing ad deficit reduction, six in ten favored it. Thus as trade-offs become salient pressures to cut defense are likely to increase.

Finally there is another more current factor that is likely to exert downward pressures. That is that there is a low level of confidence that recent US military efforts have been highly successful in increasing US security

Despite the large-scale efforts of the war on terrorism, two thirds think that "the ability of terrorists to launch another major attack on the US" is the same or greater than it was in 2001 (Pew, January 2010). The Iraq war has also been seen as increasing not decreasing the threat of terrorism (BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA, November 2005).

You may have heard reports that the American people have turned against the war in Afghanistan. This is not actually true in the sense that there is not a majority that actually wants to pull US troops out. A majority even supported Obama's surge. However, there are poll findings showing that people are quite unhappy about the war and have major questions about whether the benefits of the war have been proportional to the cost.

Americans would certainly be very wary of any possible military intervention in the future. If Americans were convinced that Iran was on the verge of acquiring a nuclear weapon and that there was a way to permanently eliminate it with a surgical air strike, they might be persuaded. However, polls show that right now they do not think this can be done and instead want to pursue non-military approaches including sanctions and diplomacy.

Some voices are saying that, short of a military strike the US should increase its military presence in the Gulf as part of an effort to contain Iran. While Americans may be persuaded that this is better than going to war, they would probably be reluctant for the US to flex its muscles in this way.

More broadly we may see some pressure toward changing the US approach to the Muslim world. The 9/11 attacks were an effort to push the US out of the Muslim world. The US responded by advancing into it further. This has provoked hostility in the Muslim world--large majorities say they want US military forces out. Americans continue to be determined to go after al Qaeda and continue to support Israel. But they are ambivalent about having a large military presence there. They are uncomfortable because they believe--correctly--that the people there do not want us there and that this may be making things worse for the US rather than better. Coupled with economic constraints we may see greater pressure for the US to lighten its military foot print in the Muslim world.

Now, all this said, I want to emphasize that Americans are not looking to simply have a vacation from international engagement.

Indeed there is even clear evidence of this in the same Pew poll that included the findings that stirred up fears of isolationism. When respondents were given a more complex set of response options their answers told quite a different story. .

Asked what kind of role the US should play in the world only 11% said it should not play any leadership role. If the public was really going through an isolationist phase more would surely have endorsed this view.

On the other hand only 14% said the US should be the single world leader. This shows how low the support is for the US playing a hegemonic role.

The option that got the clear majority--endorsed by 70%--was for the US to play "a shared leadership role." Furthermore, this group was asked a follow on question about whether the US be the most active world leader or if it should be "about as active as other leading nations." Most chose the latter option. This has not changed significantly since it was last asked in 2005.

These responses also mirror a question that PIPA and the Chicago Council have asked for some years now. Asked most recently in 2006 what role the US should play in the world only small minorities endorse the isolationist position that that US should "withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems" (12%) or the hegemonic position that the US should "continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems" (10%). A large majority (75%) instead sided with the multilateral position that the "US should do its share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries."

A recurring theme is that American public tends to look to multilateral institutions, especially the UN as a means for the US to offset its dominant role in the world.

Coming back to the Pew poll there was also strong support for having a strong UN. Eighty-one percent gave "strengthening the United Nations" "top" (37%) or "some" priority (44%) as a foreign policy goal of the US.

In 2008 the Chicago Council also found remarkable support for giving the UN expanded powers including the UN having its own standing peace-keeping force, regulating the international arms trade, and intervening in countries to prevent human rights abuses.

It is unlikely that US spending on the UN will come under pressure for reductions. In the 2005 poll, a majority did not cut spending, and, on average, spending was increased substantially.

There is likely to be some pressure to cut foreign aid spending. However this is heavily driven by the assumption that foreign aid is far greater than it is. In contrast to defense spending, when they are given information about how much is spent a majority does not want to cut it.

Increases in foreign aid spending--as the President has called for--may face some resistance. Based on polling we did in 2008 it appears that support for such increases are only likely to be supported if they are embedded in a multilateral effort, such as the Millennium Development Goals, where other countries are perceived as doing their part and also where the goal is clearly linked to a humanitarian objective such as alleviating hunger and poverty. In this context a large majority does support significant increases and this support is robust enough that it would likely survive the downward pressure of the budget process.

Bilateral aid and military aid, though, have been and are likely to continue to be quite unpopular. Anything that smacks of the US using aid to buy influence in support of its dominant role tends to be viewed negatively. Deficit pressures will likely intensify this negativity.

So in summary it seems that, despite the exhaustion from two wars and the debilitating effects of the economic crisis Americans do support continued US international engagement. At the same time Americans seem to be feeling more intensely their long-standing desire to reduce America's hegemonic role in the world. They may be looking for US Grand Strategy to be a bit less grand.

Despite the improvements in the economy it is likely that the deficit pressure will grow and it behooves those working in the field of international security to start making some adjustments for when the deficit issue arrives in full force.

Global views of the United States have improved markedly over the last year while views of many countries have become more negative, according to the latest BBC World Service poll across 28 countries. For the first time since the BBC started tracking in 2005, views of the United States' influence in the world are now more positive than negative on average.

The survey, conducted by GlobeScan/PIPA among more than 29,000 adults, asked respondents to say whether they considered the influence of different countries in the world to be mostly positive or mostly negative. It found that the United States is viewed positively on balance in 20 of 28 countries, with an average of 46 per cent now saying it has a mostly positive influence in the world, while 34 per cent say it has a negative influence.

Compared to a year earlier, negative ratings of the United States have dropped a striking nine points on average across the countries surveyed both years, while positive ratings are up a more modest four points. Ratings of the influence of many other countries, meanwhile, have declined over the past year. On average, positive ratings of the United Kingdom and Japan are down three points, Canada down six points, and the European Union down four points. Ratings of the United Kingdom's influence in the world declined significantly in 11 countries and rose in only three. (See note in full report for details of how these tracking averages have been calculated)

Germany is the most favourably viewed nation (an average of 59% positive), followed by Japan (53%), the United Kingdom (52%), Canada (51%), and France (49%). The European Union is viewed positively by 53 per cent. In contrast, Iran is the least favourably viewed nation (15%), followed by Pakistan (16%), North Korea (17%), Israel (19%), and Russia (30%).

While it is not among the most favourably viewed nations, the improvement in the ratings of the United States means it has now overtaken China in terms of positive perceptions. Fifteen countries view China favourably on balance, with an average of 41 per cent feeling it has a mostly positive influence in the world and 38 per cent feeling its influence is mostly negative.

Iran attracts mostly negative views in all countries polled except Mexico and Pakistan--on average, 56 per cent rate it negatively. Views of Iran in China and Russia have deteriorated--positive views have dropped 11 points among the Chinese people (30%) while negative views of Iran have jumped up 13 points among Russians (to 45%).

The BBC World Service Poll has been tracking opinions about country influence in the world since 2005. The latest results are based on 29,977 in-home or telephone interviews conducted across a total of 28 countries by the international polling firm GlobeScan, together with the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland. GlobeScan coordinated fieldwork between 30 November 2009 and 16 February 2010.

GlobeScan Chairman Doug Miller comments: "People around the world today view the United States more positively than at any time since the second Iraq war. While still well below that of countries like Germany and the UK, the global standing of the US is clearly on the rise again."

Steven Kull, director of PIPA, comments, "While China's image is stuck in neutral, America has motored past it in the global soft-power competition.

"After a year, it appears the 'Obama effect' is real. Its influence on people's views worldwide, though, is to soften the negative aspects of the United States' image, while positive aspects are not yet coming into strong focus."

Participating Countries

Detailed Findings

While positive views of the United States increased in most countries polled, the most significant increases were in Germany (up from 18% in 2009 to 39% this year), in Russia (up from 7% to 25%), in Portugal (up from 43% to 57%) and in Chile (up from 42% to 55%) with negative perceptions also falling significantly.

The only countries where perceptions of the United States became more negative overall were Turkey (where the proportion with positive perceptions of the United States fell from 21 per cent to 13 per cent and negative perceptions increased from 63 to 70 per cent), and in India (where positive perceptions dipped from 43 per cent to 39 per cent and negative views increased from 20 to 28 per cent).

The only two countries to have majorities with negative views of the United States are Turkey (70%) and Pakistan (52%). Russia is also quite negative (50%).

Last year's poll found that views of both Russia and China had deteriorated. Looking at the views of the countries polled in both 2009 and 2010, they appear to have stabilized somewhat this year. Views of Russia in particular are more muted, with a decline both in the proportion of those rating it positively (from 31 to 29%) and those rating it negatively (42 to 37%). China's positive ratings remain at 40 per cent, while its negative ratings have fallen a little, to 38 per cent.

European countries continue to have quite negative views of China, including Italy (72% negative), Germany (71%), France (64%), Spain and Portugal (both 54%) as do South Koreans (61%) and Americans (51%). In Africa, views are quite positive with majorities viewing it positively in Kenya and Nigeria (both 73%) and in Ghana (63%).

Views of the European Union remain mostly positive in almost all countries polled (53% overall). But there is a difference of views toward the European Union among the European nations surveyed, with Germany (76%) and France (74%) the most positive about its influence, Italy (64%) and Spain (62%) a little less favourable and the United Kingdom (54%) much less upbeat about it. Turkey--which is also highly negative about most other countries--also rates the European Union unfavourably (with only 29% positive).

In total 29,977 citizens in 28 countries, were interviewed face-to-face or by telephone between 30 November 2009 and 16 February 2010. Nations were rated by half samples in all countries polled. Polling was conducted for BBC World Service by the international polling firm GlobeScan and its research partners in each country. In ten of the 28 countries, the sample was limited to major urban areas. The margin of error per country ranges from +/-2.1 to 6.9 per cent, 19 times out of 20.

Global Views of: the United States, China, Japan, North Korea, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, India, France, South Africa, Israel, Canada, the European Union, Russia, Iran, Brazil, Germany, South Korea

Click the icon by each country to see a graph with full country-by-country results

The United States

Views of the USA are now positive in most countries around the world for the first time since tracking began. Nineteen countries give US influence positive ratings, while six lean negative and two are divided. In the 27 country average, 46 per cent view US influence positively and 34 per cent view it negatively. This represents a substantial improvement over 2009. Among countries polled in both 2009 and 2010, positive views have increased four points and negative views have decreased nine points. In 2009, 12 countries had negative views, with six expressing positive views and two divided.

Movements have been especially marked in Europe. While a majority of Spaniards (56%) had a negative view, this has dropped 23 points so that views now lean positive (40% positive, 33% negative). Similarly while France had a majority negative view last year (53%) this has dropped 14 points; now the French lean positive (45% to 39%). The United Kingdom has gone from leaning negative (41% positive, 45% negative) to leaning positive (48% to 35%).

Other allies have shifted as well. In Canada, formerly a negative majority, views now lean favorable as positive attitudes have risen by six points (now 44%, up from 38%) and negative attitudes have fallen by 17 points (now 38%, down from 55%). Japan, which was divided in 2009, now leans positive as favorable views have grown by six points (now 34%, up from 28%) and unfavorable views have declined by 11 points (now 18%, down from 29%).

In Chile, which was divided in 2009, a majority (55%) now holds positive views on US influence, up 13 points. Egypt, which leaned negative last year (40% to 48%), now leans positive (45% to 29%). Only two countries have a majority with a negative view. Turkey has 70 per cent with an unfavorable view--up seven points from last year. Pakistan has 52 per cent with a negative perspective and just 9 per cent with a positive one. Four countries continue to have a negative view: Russia (50%), Mexico (49%), Germany (47%), and China (44%). However, negative views have dropped in Russia (15 points), Germany (18 points), China (14 points), and Mexico (5 points). Besides Turkey, views also worsened in India. India still leans positive (39% to 28%), however negative views have increased by eight points and positive views have dropped by four. African countries and the Philippines, which have generally been very positive toward US influence, remain stable in these views. Large majorities are still favorable in Kenya (85%), the Philippines (82%), Ghana (72%), and Nigeria (64%).

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China

Attitudes toward China remain divided on the whole. Publics in 12 countries are most commonly favorable on Chinese influence, while 12 are negative and three are divided. On average among 27 countries, 41 per cent hold positive views and 38 per cent hold negative views. Among countries surveyed both in 2009 and 2010, the average remained roughly the same.

While in 2009 views of China had declined considerably from the previous year, this year, overall, views are largely stable. The number of countries having mostly positive or mostly negative views of China's influence was also about equal (ten positive, nine negative, and one divided). For the long-term tracking countries, on average, there was no change in positive views over the last year, while negative views inched down two points.

However underlying this aggregate stability, there have been significant shifts in views of China within different countries.

Filipinos have made a sharp reversal in views of China. While in 2009 a majority (52%) took a negative view this has dropped 21 points. Now a majority (55%) has a positive view (up 16 points). While in 2009 Japan had a clear majority with a negative view (59%), this has dropped a remarkable 21 points, so that now just 38 per cent have a negative view. Positive views climbed from 8 to 18 per cent.

Europe continues to be the region that is the most negative toward China but negative views have softened in Portugal (now 54%, down from 62%), and France (64%, down from 70%). In addition, positive views have increased among Germans (now 20%, up from 11%), although a large majority (71%) remains negative. But in Italy and Spain already low positive views have decreased by seven points so that just 14 per cent in Italy and 22 per cent in Spain view China's influence as favorable.

Negative views continue to predominate, but have nonetheless softened in Canada (now 41%, down from 58%), Turkey (now 47%, down from 64%). The minority holding negative views in Indonesia has declined to 29 from 37 per cent (43% positive). While Australians leaned positive in 2009 (47% to 37%) they now lean negative (36% positive, 43% negative). Similarly Indians went from leaning positive (30% to 24%) with many not answering, to leaning negative (30% to 38%) with more people answering. South Koreans are among the most negative toward China (61%) negative. This is up 11 points from when they were last polled in 2008. In Ghana and Central America views are still mostly positive, but less so. In Ghana, positive views have dropped 12 points (now 63%, down from 75%). In Central America positive views slipped from 62 to 57 per cent, with negative views climbing ten points. The USA remains barely negative in its views toward China, with a slight unfavorable majority (51%), which is roughly unchanged from 2009 (52%).

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Japan

Japan continues to have very positive ratings globally. Twenty-five of the countries give Japan's influence a positive rating, while only one country, China, leans negative and one is divided. On average, 53 per cent view Japanese influence positively and 21 per cent negatively.

Looking at the average of the 22 tracking countries, positive views are down three points but negative views remain virtually unchanged. Last year, out of 20 countries 16 gave Japan a positive rating, two were negative, and two were divided.

China is the only country with a balance of negative views about Japan and these views have even worsened. Positive views there have fallen 11 points (29%, down from 40%), while almost half the public remain negative (now 47%, down from 50%).

However under this generally stable and positive view there have been substantial changes. Four countries have shown marked improvements in their views of Japan. In Germany, views have moved from divided to positive, with a 12-point increase in positive views (now 50%, up from 38%) and no significant change in negative views. In Turkey, views have changed from negative to divided, with a 12-point decline in negative views (35% down from 47%). And in South Korea--which was last polled in 2008--views have warmed, shifting from negative to positive with a 27-point rise in positive views (now 64%, up from 37% in 2008) and a 23-point fall in negative views (now 29%, down from 52%). Russia's positive views have risen from 49 to 58 per cent.

Positive views are virtually unchanged while negative views have fallen eight points in the USA (now 11%, down from 19%); seven points in the Philippines (10%, down from 17%).

Favorable views have cooled but still lean positive in Spain where positive views have fallen 19 points (now 42%, down from 61%) and negative views have risen ten points (now 29%, up from 19%). In both Italy and India, positive views are down 11 points and negative views up eight and nine points, respectively. Positive views are down nine points in Central America (now 54%, down from 63%) and negative views up eight points (now 27%, up from 19%).

In two other countries, positive views have fallen but negative views are virtually unchanged. Positive views have dropped 14 points in Ghana (now 53%, down from 67%), and 11 points in Canada (now 59%, down from 70%).

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North Korea

Attitudes toward North Korea remain widely negative. Publics in 23 countries are negative about North Korea's influence, while in two countries views are positive and in three they are divided. On average among 28 countries, 48 per cent see North Korea's influence as mainly negative while 17 per cent think it mainly positive.

In the previous year, 14 countries had negative views, just one had a positive view and six were divided. Positive views have dropped three points on average since last year; negative views are virtually stable.

Of greatest note is that views in China--a major patron of North Korea--have moved in a sharply negative direction. While last year Chinese views were divided, positive views have plunged 18 points (from 42 to 24%), so that the Chinese clearly lean to the negative (positive 24%, negative 40%). Chinese approval of North Korea is now the lowest recorded over the last four years.

Another country important to North Korea--Russia--has also shifted in a negative direction. Similar to China, while in 2009 views were divided, negative views have risen 15 points (35%, up from 20%). Now Russians lean to a negative view (19% positive, 35% negative).

Two other countries have also cooled toward North Korea. In Egypt, negative views have risen eight points (now 36%, up from 28%). In Ghana, positive views have fallen 18 points (now 25%, down from 43%) and negative views have risen eight points (32%, up from 24%), moving a public once favorably disposed into leaning negative.

Publics in two countries have shifted in a positive direction toward North Korea. In Indonesia the public has gone from negative to divided, with negative views falling eight points (from 36% to 28%). And in Nigeria attitudes have gone from divided to positive, with negative views dropping six points (29%, down from 35%).

Of the 23 countries with a preponderance of negative views, the ones with the largest majorities are South Korea and Japan (both 90%), followed by Germany (86%), France (73%), the USA (70%), and Australia (65%). Just two countries are on balance positive toward North Korea: Azerbaijan (25% positive, 19% negative) and Nigeria (35% positive, 29% negative). Three publics are divided: Indonesia, Chile and Central America.

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United Kingdom

Views of the United Kingdom are positive in most countries around the world, a view that has dimmed only slightly since last year. Of 27 countries polled, 24 give the United Kingdom's influence positive ratings, while three lean negative. On average, 52 per cent view the UK positively and 20 per cent view it negatively.

Among countries polled in both 2009 and 2010, positive views have decreased three points and negative views remain unchanged.

The most dramatic changes have occurred in China and Russia, though in opposite directions. In China positive views have plunged a striking 16 points, though a bare majority (51%) continues to have a positive view of the United Kingdom (negative 21%). In Russia positive views have climbed 12 points--also to a 51 per cent positive (negative 14%).

Views have gone from warm to warmer in two countries. Among Nigerians, positive views have risen nine points (72%, up from 63%). Among the French, positive views have risen eight points (67%, up from 59%). Views lean positive and remain virtually unchanged in six countries: Ghana, Italy, Chile, Indonesia, Japan, and India.

Views have gone from warm to less warm in numerous countries. Among Canadians, positive views have dropped 12 points (now 62%, down from 74%). In Spain, positive views have fallen ten points (now 53%, down from 63%). In Portugal, positive views have fallen seven points (now 50%, down from 57%). In Egypt, positive views fell eight points (now 50%, down from 58%). Among Kenyans, positive views have fallen eight points (now 79%, down from 87%). In the Philippines, positive views have fallen nine points (now 58%, down from 67%). Among Australians, positive views fell seven points (now 62%, down from 69%). In all these countries, though, negative views have not increased; more now say "it depends" or decline to answer.

Though negative views have increased in Germany and Central America, attitudes still lean positive. In Germany, negative views have risen nine points (now 27%, up from 18%) but a majority (53%) is still positive (down from 59%). Though views lean positive in Central America, negative views rose nine points (now 30%, up from 21%).

Three countries had negative views of the United Kingdom. A majority of Turks remain negative, though this majority has declined (now 53%, down from 59%), with positive views also lower (18%, down from 24%) and more taking no position. Views in Mexico were virtually unchanged but still lean negative. Pakistan also leans negative on the United Kingdom's influence (38% negative, 9% positive) with many taking no position.

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Pakistan

Views of Pakistan remain quite negative and, overall, largely unchanged from last year. Twenty-three countries give Pakistan's influence a negative rating, two countries lean positive and two are divided. In 2009, only one of 23 countries leaned positive and two countries were divided. In the 27-country average, 51 per cent view Pakistani influence negatively and 16 per cent view it positively.

Among countries polled in both 2009 and 2010, positive views are down two points and negative views are down four points.

Views have worsened in India and Russia. In India, negative views have risen 14 points (from 49% to 63%). Among Russians, negative views are up nine points (from 37% to 46%).

In two countries, views have improved significantly. Kenyans moved from an unfavorable view to being divided, with a nine-point increase in positive views (now 39%, up from 30%), and an 11-point decrease in negative views (now 37%, down from 48%). Indonesians have shifted from being divided to leaning favorable, as positive views have risen six points (now 36%, up from 30%) and negative views have dropped slightly (now 26%, down from 29%).

Negative views are significantly lower in seven countries, though positive views have not gone up. These include Australians, (54%, down from 63%), Canadians, (49%, down from 63%), Americans (58%, down from 69%), Britons, (44%, down from 54%), Portuguese, (57%, down from 72%), Spain, (70%, down from 78%), and Filipinos (61%, down from 71%). In all these countries, neutral views and non-responses are up compared to last year.

A slight increase in negative views has moved Nigeria from divided in 2009 (32% positive, 35% negative) to leaning negative (32% positive, 40% negative) in 2010.

Among Egyptians, positive views have fallen 11 points (now 14%, down from 25%), but negative views dropped as well (now 36%, down from 41%). Those saying "It depends" have risen 16 points (now 30%, up from 14%).

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India

Worldwide, views of India lean only modestly to the positive, barely edging out views of China. Among 27 countries polled, 15 are positive about India's influence in world affairs, ten are negative and two are divided. On average, among 27 countries, 36 per cent are positive and 31 per cent negative about India's influence. A high 33 per cent do not provide an answer or are neutral.

Among the tracking countries negative views have dropped by four points, but positive views have also dropped by two points, suggesting little net gain.

While views of India were fairly negative in Europe in 2009 there has been something of a warming trend. Among the French, positive views have grown by nine points (now 38%, up from 29%). Germans' favorable perceptions have increased by ten points (now 32%, up from 22%). Among Portuguese, negative attitudes have fallen by 11 points (now 35%, down from 46%). But in all three cases, views are still predominantly negative. Italians' unfavorable views have fallen by nine points (now 34%, down from 43%), shifting them from a divided view in 2009 to leaning positive in 2010.

There has been a distinct cooling with its counterpart, China. While in 2009 views were divided there, Chinese favorable views have fallen by 15 points, so that negative views (47%) now strongly outweigh positive ones (29%). China together with Pakistan (48% have negative views) have the most negative views of India, followed by Germany (46%).

However positive views are up in its other large neighbour, Indonesia (now 50%, from 38%). Filipinos have also warmed a bit with negative feelings decreasing by eight points (45%, down from 53%), but they still largely outweigh positive feelings (28%).

In the USA negative views are down by eight points (now 18%, from 26%) and a robust 55% say they have positive views of India. South Korea is the only country with a larger percentage (56%) saying that they see India having a positive influence.

Ghanaians views have had a sharp downturn with positive views decreasing by 24 points (now 33%, from 57%). Australians have also cooled with positive views dropping from 53 to 44 per cent. But in both cases positive views continue to prevail.

In Central America, unfavorable perceptions have increased by nine points (42%, up from 33%) and is the dominant position.

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France

Views of France are positive in nearly all countries around the world, an attitude that has not changed significantly from last year. Of 27 countries polled, 25 gave French influence positive ratings, one (Turkey) had a majority with negative views and one leaned negative. In the 27-country average, 49 per cent view French influence positively and 19 per cent view it negatively.

Among countries polled in both 2009 and 2010, on average positive views have decreased four points; negative views have decreased two points.

Notable increases in positive views are found in Germany (now 66%, up from 55%), Russia (now 63%, up from 56%), and Indonesia (now 49%, up from 42%). Brazil, which was last polled in 2008, is now 24 points more favorable (now 69%, up from 45%).

Notable decreases in positive views of French influence are found among Canadians--positive views have fallen 16 points (now 51%, down from 67%), Spaniards (now 61%, down from 74%), Portuguese (now 62%, down from 69%), Ghanaians (now 46%, down from 57%), and Australians (now 47%, down from 56%). After years of steady increases Americans positive ratings of France have slipped ten points (now 42% down from 52%); just 28 per cent have a negative view, but this is the fourth highest of all countries polled.

The one country with a majority negative view--Turkey--has shown a decrease from 58 to 53 per cent in those saying France is having a negative influence. The only other country to lean negative was Pakistan, but only 23 per cent held this position with 12 per cent giving a positive rating and a remarkable two thirds not providing an answer.

Curiously, there was a substantial increase in the number of people not providing a response or giving a neutral response, thus lowering both positive and negative responses in four countries. Among Britons, both positive views (48%, down from 55%) and negative views (18%, down from 25%) have dropped seven points. Among Egyptians, positive views are down nine points (42%, down from 51%) and negative views down five points (13%, down from 18%). In China, positive views fell six points (38%, down from 44%) and negative views fell 21 points (24% down from 45%). In the Philippines, positive views have fallen nine points (45%, down from 54%) and negative views have dropped seven points (22%, down from 29%).

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South Africa

Views of South Africa have warmed somewhat from last year. Of the 28 countries polled in 2010, 11 countries give South African influence a positive rating, five countries lean negative, and 12 countries are divided. In the 28-country average, 34 per cent view South African influence positively and 27 per cent view it negatively.

Among countries polled in both 2009 and 2010, negative views are down five points on average, though positive views remain unchanged.

South Africa is especially popular among its neighbours with majorities saying that it is having a positive influence in Kenya (79%), Nigeria (59%), and Ghana (51%). Positive views in Ghana, though, are down nine points.

In no country does a majority have a negative view though views lean close to majority negative in the Philippines, Germany and Brazil.

Views have shifted from negative to positive in Canada and the United Kingdom. In Canada, negative views have fallen 14 points (28%, down from 42%). Among Britons negative views have fallen 22 points (25%, down from 47%), while positive views have risen six points (36%, up from 30%).

Ratings have shifted from divided to positive in France and Portugal, as well as Central America. In France, positive views have risen 14 points (52%, up from 38%), and negative views are down ten points (25%, down from 35%). In Portugal, negative views have fallen 15 points (19%, down from 34%) and positive views have improved (37%, up from 32%). Also, in Central America positive views have risen eight points (36%, up from 28%).

In Australia, views of South Africa have shifted from negative to being divided. Negative views have fallen 11 points (now 30%, down from 41%).

Views shifted toward the negative in three countries. In Egypt, ratings shifted from divided to negative as positive views fell 16 points (now 14%, down from 30%). In Russia, ratings shifted from positive to divided; though positive views rose a little, negative views rose ten points (now 23%, up from 13%). In Japan, positive views fell five points and negative views rose five points as well, leaving attitudes divided instead of leaning positive as they did last year.

Views warmed in Chile, where positive views rose nine points (now 45%, up from 36%), while negative views fell eight points (now 17%, down from 25%). Among Americans, negative views have fallen 13 points (now 27%, down from 40%). Among Germans, negative attitudes have softened; positive views have risen 16 points (now 31%, up from 15%) while negative views have fallen eight points (now 45%, down from 53%). In China negative views are down 14 points (now 19%, down from 33%).

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Israel

Attitudes toward Israel are widely negative. Twenty-four countries give an unfavorable evaluation, while only two evaluate Israel positively, and two are divided. In the 28-country average, 50 per cent rate Israel's influence negatively and 19 per cent rate it positively.

Even so, the average of countries polled in both 2009 and 2010 became slightly less negative; unfavorable ratings have dropped by four points.

Views improved but remained negative in several countries. Unfavorable ratings have dropped in Australia by 20 points (now 47%, down from 67%), in Canada by 14 points (now 38%, down from 52%), in China by 12 points (now 40%, down from 52%), in Japan by 11 points (now 52%, down from 63%), in Portugal by 22 points (now 46%, down from 68%), in Spain by 11 points (now 60%, down from 71%)

The USA has remained one of the two countries offering a positive rating overall, although this has dropped seven points (now 40%, down from 47%). It is joined by Kenya, where a drop in negative ratings by seven points (now 34%, from 41%) has caused it to lean slightly positive (39% positive). Russia continues to be quite divided (29% positive, 30% negative).

Majority-Muslim countries continue to have negative views about Israel's influence. All five of these countries surveyed have negative majorities: Egypt (92%), Turkey (77%), Indonesia (56%), Pakistan (53%), and Azerbaijan (51%).

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Canada

Canada, while being the fourth most positively evaluated nation, has seen its favorable ratings decline overall. Among countries polled in 2009 and 2010, the average positive rating has dropped by six points.

Twenty-four countries say Canada has a positive influence in world affairs and three countries lean toward saying its influence is negative. In the 2010 average of 27 countries, 51 per cent are favorable and 14 per cent are unfavorable.

Favorable positions have weakened in some of Canada's closest friends including the USA by 15 points (now 67%, down from 82%), and the United Kingdom by 12 points (now 62%, down from 74%).

Drops in positive ratings were elsewhere as well. China had a remarkable 21-point drop in positive views (now 54%, down from 75%). And there were significant drops in Portugal by 12 points (now 59%, down from 71%), Nigeria by 12 points (now 43%, down from 55%), in Spain by ten points (now 54%, down from 64%), in Italy by nine points (now 65%, down from 74%), in Egypt by eight points (now 18%, down from 26%), and in the Philippines by eight points (now 75%, down from 83%).

Despite widespread erosion in positive views, only three countries lean toward a negative rating and none of them by a majority: Turkey (35% negative, 16% positive), Egypt (22% negative, 18% positive), and Pakistan (19% negative, 11% positive).

On the other hand attitudes toward Canada have improved in Germany, Russia, and Turkey. In each of the first two countries, positive ratings have increased substantially: in Germany by nine points (now 73%, up from 64%) and in Russia by eight points (now 44%, up from 36%). In Turkey, negative ratings have dropped by 14 points (now 35%, down from 49%).

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The European Union

The European Union continues to receive positive evaluations from nearly every country polled; however, these views have receded in several countries. Among the 22 countries surveyed outside the European Union, 19 offer positive ratings, two offer negative ratings, and one is divided. All the European Union members are quite positive.

On average, in the 22 countries polled outside the European Union, 49 per cent call its influence positive and 19 per cent call it negative. On average among tracking countries, though, there has been a four point drop in positive views.

Outside the Union, favorable ratings have fallen in: Canada, by 16 points (now 57%, down from 73%); the USA, by 12 points (now 50%, down from 62%); India, by 13 points (now 23%, down from 36%); China, by 16 points (now 41%, down from 57%); the Philippines, by 11 points (now 54%, down from 65%); and Australia, by ten points (now 55%, down from 65%).

Views of the European Union have improved in Russia, Egypt, and Indonesia. Among Russians, positive views have increased by 19 points (now 50%, up from 31%), and by seven points among Indonesians (now 44%, from 37%). Egyptians' negative ratings have dropped by 15 points (now 20%, down from 35%).

Turkey, the only country that leaned negative on the European Union's influence in 2009, is joined in this view by Pakistan, which was polled for the first time in 2010. Turkey's views are 29 per cent positive, 45 per cent negative. Pakistan's views are 10 per cent positive, 30 per cent negative.

Within the Union, views have cooled in several of the six member countries polled. In Spain, positive views have decreased by 14 points (62%, down from 76%). Similarly, favorable ratings also have dropped in Italy (now 64% from 72%). In Germany where views are still very positive, negative views have nonetheless risen by seven points (12%, up from 5%). The United Kingdom bucks the trend, as negative views have fallen by six points (22%, down from 28%).

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Russia

Though views on Russia's influence are still predominantly negative worldwide, these have softened in the past year, after having worsened between 2008 and 2009. In the 27-country average for the current survey, 37 per cent hold negative views and 30 per cent hold positive views. Seventeen countries give Russia's influence a negative rating, seven give it a positive rating, and three are divided.

Most dramatic, the publics in the United Kingdom and Canada have gone from being negative to being divided, as unfavorable views have decreased by 22 points in the United Kingdom (now 33%, down from 55%) and by 20 points in Canada (now 34%, down from 54%).

Negative attitudes have also moderated notably in the USA, Germany, and France, though these countries are still predominantly negative. Among Americans, negative views have dropped by 18 points bringing it below half (now 46%, down from 64%). Among Germans, negative views have fallen by 16 points (now 54%, down from 70%), and among the French by 11 points (now 55%, down from 66%).

Other notable drops are found in Portugal, by 18 points (now 36%, down from 54%); Turkey, by 14 points (now 50%, down from 64%); Japan, by 16 points (now 22%, down from 38%); and Chile, by nine points (now 24%, down from 33%). Except Chile, all of these are also still predominantly negative.

Against the larger trend, several countries have grown more negative about Russia's influence. Favorable evaluations have decreased in China by 19 points (now 55%, down from 74%). In Africa, Kenya has swung from a positive position to a divided one as favorable ratings have dropped by 18 points (now 37%, down from 55%) and unfavorable ratings have risen by nine points (now 38%, up from 29%). Likewise, favorable ratings have dropped in Ghana by 18 points (now 32%, down from 50%). Also Nigeria has become predominantly unfavorable as positive views have decreased by six points (now 31%, down from 37%) and negative views have increased by six points (now 42%, up from 36%). Unfavorable evaluations in Mexico have increased by eight points (now 29%, from 21%).

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Iran

Attitudes toward Iran are still the most negative of all countries included in the poll. Twenty-five out of 28 countries surveyed are most commonly negative about Iran's influence (Pakistan is positive and two are divided). In the 2010 28-country average, 56 per cent have an unfavorable opinion of Iranian influence and 15 per cent have a favorable opinion. Among tracking countries, the percentage saying Iranian influence is positive has slipped four points between 2009 and 2010.

Two countries have shifted from being divided to leaning negative. In Ghana, positive views have decreased by 23 points (now 13%, down from 36%) and negative views have increased by ten points (now 45%, up from 35%). In Nigeria, positive views have declined by eight points (now 28%, down from 36%) and negative views have grown by six points (now 42%, up from 36%). Indians' views have gone from slightly positive in 2009 (24% positive, 19% negative) to leaning negative in 2010 (19% positive and 33% negative).

Significant to current negotiations over sanctions in the United Nations' Security Council views of Iran in Russia and China have turned more negative. Among Russians, negative ratings have grown by 13 points (now 45%, up from 32%). Favorable views have slipped in China by 11 points (now 30%, down from 41%).

Favorable attitudes on Iranian influence have also slipped in its regional neighbour Egypt, by nine points (now 27%, down from 36%). Central Americans' unfavorable views have risen by nine points (now 58%, up from 49%).

In five countries negative views have moderated. Negative evaluations have decreased by 12 points in Canada (now 60%, down from 72%), by ten points in the USA (now 69%, down from 79%), by nine points in the United Kingdom (now 59%, down from 68%), by 12 points in Portugal (now 67%, down from 79%), and by eight points in the Philippines (now 64%, down from 72%).

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Brazil

Brazil maintains its positive standing in the eyes of most publics around the world. Twenty-one countries have favorable views, three have negative views, and three are divided. On average in the 2010 poll of 27 countries, 41 per cent give positive ratings and 23 per cent give negative ratings. Among the 22 tracking countries from 2009, positive ratings dropped by three point (42%, down from 45%) but negative ratings remained steady (23%).

Brazil is quite popular with its neighbours. Majorities have positive views in Chile (77%), Mexico (59%), and Central America (55%). In Chile, favorable opinions have increased by 13 points (up from 64%). But among Mexicans, positive evaluations have fallen by 19 points (59%, down from 78%).

Views have shifted in a positive direction in a number of European countries. In the United Kingdom, negative perceptions have dropped by 15 points (now 20%, down from 35%). Britons now lean positively, after being divided previously. Germans' attitudes have gone leaning negative to being divided, as positive views have risen by six points (now 36%, up from 30%). Positive attitudes have also increased in France by eight points (now 50%, up from 42%).

Views have shifted in a negative direction in Egypt and India. Egypt has changed from leaning positive to leaning negative, as favorable evaluations have dropped by 15 points (to 18%, down from 33%). Indians have moved from favorable to divided, as negative views have risen by eight points (to 23%, up from 15%).

Positive opinions of Brazil have also declined in each of the following countries: China by ten points (now 55%, down from 65%), Ghana by nine points (now 41%, down from 50%), Italy by nine points (now 40%, down from 49%), Canada by eight points (now 38%, down from 46%) and Nigeria by nine points (now 38%, down from 47%).

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Germany

Opinion on Germany's influence remains the most positive of any country evaluated. Twenty-four countries give a positive rating and none have significant negative number--the highest being 33 per cent in Turkey.

On average in the current year, 59 per cent are positive and 14 per cent are negative. The average position remained virtually unchanged from year-to-year among trendline countries.

Positive views have strengthened in several countries, most significantly in Egypt and Chile. Among Egyptians, favorable opinion has grown by 11 points (now 50%, up from 39%) and negative opinion has dropped by 14 points. Chileans' positive views have risen by 12 points (now 66%, up from 54%). Positive views have increased in Russia by eight points (now 61%, up from 53%). Negative views declined among Mexicans by eight points (17%, down from 25%).

However Indians and Turks are now divided on Germany's influence, after both leaned positive in 2009. In India, favorable evaluations have decreased by 11 points (22%, down from 33%) and negative evaluations have increased by eight points (19%, up from 11%). In Turkey, positive ratings have dropped by 14 points (30%, down from 44%).

Also unfavorable ratings have increased in Central America by eight points (28%, up from 20%). Pakistan leans slightly negative, as 18 per cent rate Germany's influence negatively and 13 per cent rate it positively.

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South Korea

Opinion on South Korea, evaluated for the first time in 2010, is divided. Nine countries hold negative views, 12 hold positive views, and six are divided. In the 27-country average, 32 per cent are favorable and 30 per cent are unfavorable. A high average of 39 per cent does not provide an answer one way or the other.

Within the Asian-Pacific region, perceptions of South Korea's influence are mildly positive. Publics are favorable in China (57%), and the Philippines (50%), and lean that way in Indonesia (43%), Japan (36%), and Australia (35%). India and Pakistan are divided, but most do not provide an answer. Thailand is the main exception, as 58 per cent say South Korea has a negative influence.

European countries are predominantly negative about South Korea's influence in the world. Unfavorable views are found in a majority in Germany (53%), and substantial pluralities in Italy (46%), Spain (46%), and France (45%). With most not taking a position, views are divided in the United Kingdom and Portugal, but lean very slightly positive in Russia.

Most countries in the Americas lean favorably including the USA (46%), Chile (45%), Mexico (40%), Central America (39%), and Canada (37%). The exception is Brazil which leans negative (43%).

Africans included in the survey offer mixed views on South Korea. Ghanaians lean positive (41% favorable), Kenyans are divided, and Nigerians lean negative (37% unfavorable). This is an unusually negative view for Africans.

In the Middle East, views in Egypt (37%) and Turkey (30%) lean negative, while Azerbaijan is divided, though 63 per cent of Azeri do not have an opinion a way or another.

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Questionnaire (PDF hosted at Truman Institute website)

A survey of the Israeli general public and Israeli settlers taken in early March shows three-fifths of the Israeli public (60%) support "dismantling most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians." This is eleven points higher than the previous reading (49%) taken in December, 2009, and is the highest level recorded since 2005, during the debate over evacuating the Gaza Strip. Just one-third of the Israeli public (33%) opposes dismantling most settlements, including 13 percent very strongly opposed. This is the lowest level of strong opposition to dismantling settlements recorded by the Truman Institute for the 26 surveys in which this question has been asked since 2001. The survey was conducted by the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Ma'ale Adumim, an Israeli settlement in the West Bank (Photo: michaelramallah)

In contrast to the views of the Israeli public, among Israeli settlers a large majority (69%) oppose dismantling most West Bank settlements. Moreover, a majority of settlers believe most of the Israeli general public shares its opposition to dismantling settlements. This is but one of several major misperceptions regarding the settlements issue revealed by the latest Truman Institute survey.

The survey found numerous misperceptions among both the settlers and the general Israeli public. These include considerable underestimations of the Israeli public's predominant support for dismantling most West Bank settlements as part of a peace agreement, and the extent to which settlers' decisions to live in the West Bank are driven by personal quality of life issues, rather than by belief in a national or religious mission. Also, both the Israeli public and the settlers overestimate settlers' willingness to resist "by all means" a comprehensive evacuation of settlements in the West Bank.

These and other findings are examined more fully below.

The Truman Research Institute surveys of the Israeli public (sample of 501) and Israeli settlers (sample of 506) were completed by phone interviews between March 1-10 (general public) and March 4-14 (settlers). The margin of error for each sample is +/-4.9 percent. The settlers' survey dates overlap and may have been influenced by Vice President Biden's visit to Israel and his criticism, publicized on March 10, of the Israeli government's announcement of new housing units in East Jerusalem.

Views on Dismantling Most West Bank Settlements

A majority of Israeli settlers reject the idea of dismantling most settlements as part of a peace accord and believe, mistakenly, that most Israelis share their conviction. Israeli settlers and the full Israeli public were first asked about their own preferences about "dismantling most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians," and then asked about their perceptions of how most Israelis view this issue.

The preferences of settlers and the Israeli public clash sharply: A 69 percent majority of settlers oppose dismantling most settlements as part of a peace agreement (23% in favor), while a 60 percent majority of the Israeli public support doing so, with 33% opposed. This is up sharply from plurality support of 49 to 43 percent last December.

However, the current near two-to-one Israeli public support for dismantling most settlements is misperceived by Israeli settlers, and even by the Israeli public to a lesser extent: Most settlers (57%) believe that a majority of the Israeli public oppose dismantling most settlements -- the reverse from what is actually the case. About one-third of the Israeli public (31%) believe a majority of Israelis supports dismantling most settlements, which is half the number who actually do so (60%).

One effect of the settlers' misperception that the Israeli public shares their view may be their readiness to support a general referendum as the way to legitimize their position on the settlements. Three-fifths of settlers say that the "authority to decide to evacuate or not evacuate settlements in Judea and Samaria" should rest with a referendum (60% compared to 36% who oppose it). No other institution came close to this level of confidence among settlers -- "the government" (43% of settlers favor giving it this authority), "the Knesset" (43%) or a Rabbinical authority (24%). In contrast, most of the Israeli general public prefer that such authority be vested in "the government" (72%) or "the Knesset" (67%), compared to half (51%) who favor a referendum.

Israeli Settlers' Motives and Values

Israeli settlers and the Israeli public as a whole overestimate the extent to which most settlement activity is driven by settlers' sense of religious or national mission. The settlers were first asked which of three factors was the most important reason for their own decision to live in their current settlement. "Personal wish for quality of life, housing and community" (46%) was found to outweigh a sense of "national or religious mission to inhabit the land" (31%), while belief that the territories enhance Israel's security (15%) was rated a distant third.

Israeli settlers and the full Israeli public were then asked which of these three motives they thought was most important for the majority of settlers living in the West Bank. Both Israeli settlers and the full Israeli public mistakenly believe that a sense of national or religious mission far outweigh personal quality of life issues as the primary motive for most Israeli settlers (see graph).

Israeli settlers were also asked their opinion about which of four different values affecting Israel's future development was the most important one. The value of "Israel with a Jewish majority" rates much higher among settlers (49% of settlers rate it as most important) than the value of "greater Israel" (16%), "democracy" (12%), or "peace" (20%). Despite this clear preference for a mainly Jewish state, a majority of settlers on a separate question expressed opposition to the proposed "two-state solution" (53% vs. 39% support) that would ensure a Jewish majority in the state of Israel.

Potential Resistance to Government's Order to Evacuate Settlements

The extent of likely settler resistance to a government decision for a comprehensive evacuation of West Bank settlements is overestimated threefold by the Israeli public -- and to a lesser extent by the settlers themselves. Israeli settlers and the full Israeli pubic were asked first about their own reaction "if the government decides on a comprehensive evacuation of settlements" in the West Bank, and then about how they thought most settlers in the West Bank would react to such a decision.

Most settlers said they would either obey a government decision for a comprehensive evacuation of settlements (20%) or only resist it by legal means (52%). One fifth of the settlers (21%) said they would "resist it by all means." However, when asked how they expected most settlers to react to such a government order, nearly three-fifths of the Israeli public (57%) -- and two-fifths (40%) of settlers -- believed most settlers would resist the decision by all means (see graphs).

Settlers were asked separately about their personal participation in earlier protests against the freezing or evacuation of settlements. About one-fourth (27%) said they had participated in "demonstrations, marches or assemblies" held in the West Bank; about one-tenth (9%) said they had participated in "active resistance to IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] evacuation of an outpost or settlement."

Conclusion

The Truman Institute's latest survey sheds light on Israeli views regarding West Bank settlements that are grounds for a less pessimistic outlook about Israeli-Palestinian peace prospects. The Israeli public's support for dismantling most settlements as part of a peace agreement has risen considerably in recent months and is at its highest level in five years (60%). Surprisingly, no more than a third of Israel's public and settlers know that the Israeli public mainly supports dismantling most settlements. Moreover, both the Israeli public and the settlers themselves greatly underestimate the extent to which settlers' decisions to live in the West Bank are driven by personal rather than ideological concerns and the extent to which settlers are willing to stay within the law in response to a government-ordered comprehensive settlement evacuation.

Originally published in the March 14th issue of The Baltimore Sun

Polls on health care can be confusing. At last month's health care summit, Republicans repeatedly asserted that the majority is with them in their opposition to the president's health care reform plan. President Barack Obama asserted that majorities support all the major specific elements of the plan. Can they both be right?

It is true that in numerous polls, a plurality or a slight majority say that they are opposed to the health care plan. But it is misleading to imply that this means that the public is aligned with the Republicans. In a recent Newsweek poll, only 21 percent approved of how the Republicans are handling health care.

More important, several polls reveal that many of the people who oppose Mr. Obama's health care plan do so not because they fear it will go too far in changing the status quo but because they think it does not go far enough.

For example, similar to other polls, a Feb. 26-28 Ipsos/McClatchy poll first found that 41 percent said they favored the health care plan under consideration, while 47 percent were opposed. A follow-on question, though, found that many of those opposed to it (17 percent of the whole sample) did so because it did not go far enough. Only 25 percent aligned with the Republican position by complaining that it goes too far.

Rather than thinking of the public as divided along party lines, it is better to think of it as being like Goldilocks and the porridge. Twenty-five percent say the health care plan goes too far, 17 percent say it does not go far enough (some are still disappointed over the removal of the public option), while 41 percent say it is about right. Rather than being on one side of the spectrum, it appears that the proposed health care plan occupies the middle ground of the electorate.

This helps us understand how Mr. Obama can also be right when he says that the public supports most of the key elements of the plan. While many people are not satisfied with the plan overall, numerous polls have found that there does seem to be consensus about most of its key elements.

In a recent Newsweek poll, majorities supported insurance exchanges (81 percent); requiring insurance companies to cover people regardless of pre-existing conditions (76 percent); requiring most businesses to provide coverage (75 percent); and requiring all Americans to have health insurance, with the government providing subsidies for those who cannot afford it (59 percent).

A Kaiser Foundation poll found large majorities saying that it is at least somewhat important to close the Medicare "doughnut hole" (91 percent); expand the existing Medicaid program to cover more low-income, uninsured Americans (81 percent); limit future increases in Medicare payments to health care providers as a way to help pay for health reform (73 percent); and allow health insurers to sell health insurance across state lines (74 percent).

But this does not mean that the public is giving Mr. Obama the big "go ahead." It really bothers Americans that the bill is not more bipartisan. A March 3-8 Associated Press poll found 61 percent saying bipartisan support is very important. Sixty-eight percent said the president should keep trying to make a deal with the Republicans. Americans also like some of the Republican proposals. Kaiser found 79 percent saying that tort reform is important.

At the same time, Republicans should not be overconfident. The public is watching them warily. Ipsos/McClatchy found that only 36 percent think the Republicans are working hard to compromise, while 57 percent think they are deliberately avoiding compromise to obstruct the bill in any form.

At some point, the public may give up on bipartisanship. Because, as AP found, only 15 percent say they are content to leave the health care system as it is now.

Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, has conducted several major studies of U.S. public attitudes on health care. His e-mail is skull@pipa.org.

The poll of more than 27,000 adults conducted by GlobeScan found that 87 per cent of those who used the internet felt that internet access should be "the fundamental right of all people." More than seven in ten (71%) non-internet users also felt that they should have the right to access the web.

Countries where very high proportions regarded internet access as their fundamental right included South Korea (96%), Mexico (94%), and China (87%).

Most web users are very positive about the changes the internet has brought to their lives, with strong support for the information available, the greater freedom it brings and social networking. However there was caution about expressing opinions online and fraud.

Nearly four in five (78%) said they felt it had brought them greater freedom, nine in ten (90%) said they thought it was a good place to learn, and just over half (51%) said they now enjoyed spending their spare time on social networking sites like Facebook or MySpace.

Despite this enthusiasm there is also concern, with many web users cautious about speaking their minds online. The poll found that they were evenly split between those who felt that "the internet is a safe place to express my opinions" (48%) and those who did not feel this (49%).

Japan was among the countries where most web users did not feel they could express their opinions safely online (65%), alongside South Korea (70%), France (69%), Germany (72%), and China (55%). In contrast, most Indians (70%), Ghanaians (74%), and Kenyans (73%) felt they could express their opinions safely.

The poll also showed that most internet users feel that the internet should not be regulated by governments. More than half (53%) of internet users agreed that "the internet should never be regulated by any level of government anywhere"--including large majorities in South Korea (83%), Nigeria (77%), and Mexico (72%). Forty-four per cent admitted that they did not think they could cope without the internet. Many more felt this way in Japan (84%), Mexico (81%), and Russia (71%), while fewer felt they could not cope without the internet in Pakistan (19%), the Philippines (21%), Turkey (27%), Brazil, and India (both 29%).

Asked what aspect of the internet they most valued, people most commonly identified the ability to find information of all sorts (47%), with its next most popular aspect being the ability to interact and communicate with people (32%). The internet's roles as a source of entertainment (12%), as a tool to locate, research, and buy products and services (5%), and as a forum for creativity and sharing of content (3%) were less commonly mentioned as its most valuable aspect.

The poll also found that fraud was the aspect of the internet that caused people most concern, with 32 per cent saying it was what worried them most. Fraud emerged as a greater public concern than violent and explicit content, which was mentioned by 27 per cent, and threats to privacy, which were the major concern of one in five people (20%).

As BBC World Service reported last month, the poll also reveals that around one in three internet users across the countries polled regard the web as a good place to find a boyfriend or girlfriend.

The poll was commissioned for SuperPower, a major season throughout March on the BBC's international news services: BBC World Service, BBC World News and BBC.com, exploring the extraordinary power of the internet.

The results are drawn from a survey of 27,973 adult citizens across 26 countries, including 14,306 internet users, conducted for BBC World Service by the international polling firm GlobeScan. GlobeScan coordinated fieldwork, involving telephone and in-person interviews, between 30 November 2009 and 7 February 2010.

GlobeScan Chairman Doug Miller commented: "Despite worries about privacy and fraud, people around the world see access to the internet as their fundamental right. They think the web is a force for good, and most don't want governments to regulate it."

By Alvin Richman^*

Editor's Note:

With the post-election crackdown in Iran, a key question is to what degree Iranians are being effectively intimidated from expressing views that are at odds with the regime. This question is relevant to the regime's prospects for success or failure in its efforts to suppress dissent. It is also an important indicator, along with other trend measures, of whether surveys of the Iranian public continue to be valid. Very briefly, the present article finds only a modest decline in readiness to express dissenting views.

Overview -- Comparison of the findings from the early 2008 and late 2009 Iran surveys conducted by World Public Opinion (WPO) shows that the number of Iranians who consistently express very critical views of their government associated with Reformers has fallen by just four percentage points amidst the current repressive climate (from 17% to 13%), and the number expressing moderately critical views has fallen by six points (from 46% to 40%). During this period, the number of Iranians who consistently express positive views of their political system associated with Conservatives has risen by 11 points (from 36% to 47%). About one-fifth of these Conservatives (10% of the public) take a militant position against U.S. influence, and can be termed "Hardline Conservatives." The views of these several groups continue to diverge considerably on most public issues, with the notable exception that all groups mainly eschew Iran's development of nuclear weapons. Demographically, WPO's 2009 survey shows that Reformers tend to be younger, better educated and more likely to live in urban areas than Moderates and Conservatives.

Regime support groups -- Three separate opinion groups within the Iranian public were initially identified in analyses of World Public Opinion's 1-2/2008 survey, using the statistical clustering technique Latent Class Analysis on three different measures of support for the Iranian government.¹ Consistent with much ongoing analytical discourse inside and outside Iran, these three groups were labeled as Conservatives, Moderates and Reformers. The three groups differ sharply in how they view Iran's system of government. The same three groups were recreated on WPO's latest Iran survey (8/27-9/10/09),² as well as its early 2008 survey, using a simplified 7-point scale based on responses to the same three government support measures. All three of these measures, discussed below, tap the theoretical construct of "regime support," with Conservatives identified as those consistently supportive of the regime, Reformers consistently opposed, and Moderates having mixed views.

Respondents who answered all three questions (89% of the 8-9/09 survey sample) were located on a 7-point scale, ranging from 0 for those definitely opposing Iran's government on all three questions to 6 points for those definitely supporting the government on all three questions. Three groups of respondents are identified based on these scores -- Conservatives (5-6 points), Moderates (2-4 points), and Reformers (0-1 point) -- and their divergent views mirror the diversity of opinion among Iran's political elites. ³

Regime support measures -- The three major substantive groups within Iran's public are defined by their sharp and consistent divergence on these three WPO questions relating to support of the Iranian government ("regime support"): (1) Satisfaction with the Iranian election process ("very satisfied" given 2 scale points, "somewhat satisfied" -- 1 scale point, and "not very satisfied" or "not at all satisfied" -- 0 points); (2) Support for the government's right to censor destabilizing news (2 scale points) versus support for a free press (0 points); and (3) Trust in Iran's national government (trust "most of the time" -- 2 scale points, trust "some of the time" -- 1 point, and trust "rarely" or "never" -- 0 points). (See Table 1 for the exact wording and findings for each of these questions.) On each of these questions support for the regime declines sharply and progressively from the highest regime support (Conservatives) to the least regime support (Reformers). For example, the vast majority of Conservatives (91%) trust the Iranian government "most of the time," most Moderates (58%) trust it "some of the time," and most Reformers (65%) trust it "rarely" or "never" (see Table 1A).

The three groups show naturally sharp contrast on the question containing only two choices -- having either media freedom or government censorship. All Conservatives favor the government's right to censor potentially destabilizing news and all Reformers favor media freedom. Moderates favor media freedom over government's right to censor media by a 61-39 percent majority (Table 1B).

The three groups also differ considerably in their assessment of the process by which authorities generally are elected in Iran. Most Conservatives (64%) are "very satisfied" with the Iranian election process, most Moderates (61%) are "somewhat satisfied" with it, while the vast majority of Reformers (87%) are "not very" or "not at all" satisfied with the Iranian election process (Table 1C). The 11-point increase since 2008 in the number of Conservatives identified by our regime support scale is due mainly to changes in response on this question. The number of respondents saying they were "very satisfied" with the Iranian election process doubled between the 2008 (20%) and 2009 (42%) surveys.⁴ In contrast, the number of respondents who said they trust the Iranian government "most of the time" rose only 1 percentage point (from 55% to 56%), and the number who expressed support for government's right to censor the media rose 3 percentage points (from 60% to 63%) between the 2008 and 2009 surveys.⁵ Employed together these three regime support measures should gauge the size and positions of different Iranian factions over time more reliably than would a single measure.

Additional issues, besides the regime support measures, on which Iranian Conservatives, Moderates and Reformers diverge are discussed in the text below. These include other questions relating to Iran's domestic institutions (e.g., opinions regarding President Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader) and perceptions of the U.S. government. Several instances of "partial divergence" will also be examined, in which two of the groups share fairly similar views on an issue, but these views differ sharply from those of the third group. An example of partial divergence is opinion of the American people, in which Conservatives and Moderates are both closely divided, while a large majority of Reformers have a favorable opinion. Then, several issues are examined in which the views of the three groups converge, including minority support within all groups for Iran's developing nuclear weapons and the widespread belief within all groups that a U.S. objective is to maintain control over Middle East oil resources.

Click here to continue reading the full report

¹Latent Class Analysis (LCA) segmented the sample statistically into relatively homogeneous groups based on respondents' answers to the three questions relating to support for the Iranian government. Additional information about this analytical approach is contained in an earlier article co-authored with David B. Nolle and Elaine El Assal, "Iranian Public Is Not Monolithic: Iranians Divide Over Their Government But Unite on Forgoing Nuclear Weapons," World Public Opinion.org., 5/18/09.

²This survey is based on telephone interviews with a sample of 1,003 Iranians. More than four-fifths of Iranians have landline telephones in their households. About half of the households contacted (52%) refused to be interviewed.

³A number of scholars have written about the major political factions among the Iranian elites (see, for example, the works of Shahram Chubin, Akbar Ganji, Ray Takeyh, and Sanam Vakil), but comparable empirical analyses of the major political divisions in representative national surveys of the Iranian public are rare.

⁴This increase between the 2008 and 2009 surveys is due to the increased percentage of Conservatives (from 38% to 64%) and Moderates (from 12% to 28%) who said they were "very satisfied" with the Iranian election process. None of the Reformers were "very satisfied" on either survey; in fact, about nine-tenths of Reformers expressed dissatisfaction on both surveys.

⁵Reference to the number of respondents here refers to the 89% of the sample who responded to all three regime support questions on the 2009 survey, and to the 70% who did so on the 2008 survey, and thus who could be scaled and categorized as either Conservative, Moderate or Reformer. Five other questions, besides the three regime support measures, were asked on both the 2008 and 2009 surveys. Two of these show distinct shifts, although not nearly as great as the 22-point change in very satisfied with the election process noted above: Favorable opinion of the U.S. government rose nine percentage points between 2008 and 2009 (from 8% to 17%). Also, perception that a U.S. goal is to maintain control over Middle East oil resources fell eight points (from 87% in 2008 to 79% in 2009). However, on three other trend questions, as well as two of the three regime support measures discussed above, changes in response between the 2008 and 2009 surveys were only three percentage points or less.

WPO Dataset for Download (SPSS Format)
GlobeScan Dataset for Download (SPSS Format)

Indications of fraud in the June 12 Iranian presidential election, together with large-scale street demonstrations, have led to claims that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did not actually win the election, and that the majority of Iranians perceive their government as illegitimate and favor regime change.

An analysis of multiple polls of the Iranian public from three different sources finds little evidence to support such conclusions.

The analysis conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland (PIPA), was based on:

•  a series of 10 recently-released polls conducted by the University of Tehran; eight conducted in the month before the June 12 election and two conducted in the month after the election, based on telephone interviews conducted within Iran
•  a poll by GlobeScan conducted shortly after the election, based on telephone interviews conducted within Iran
•  a poll by WorldPublicOpinion.org (managed by PIPA) conducted August 27--September 10, based on telephone interviews made by calling into Iran

The study sought to address the widely-discussed hypotheses that Ahmadinejad did not win the June 12 election and that the Iranian people perceive their government as illegitimate. It also sought to explore the assumption that the opposition represents a movement favoring a substantially different posture toward the United States. The analysis of the data found little evidence to support any of these hypotheses.

Steven Kull, director of PIPA, said, "Our analysis suggests that it would not be prudent to base US policy on the assumption that the Iranian public is in a pre-revolutionary state of mind."

On the question of whether Ahmadinejad won the June 12 election, in the week before the election and after the election, in all polls a majority said they planned to or did vote for Ahmadinejad. These numbers ranged from 52 to 57% immediately before the election and 55 to 66% after the election.

Steven Kull comments, "These findings do not prove that there were no irregularities in the election process. But they do not support the belief that a majority rejected Ahmadinejad."

The analysis did reveal factors that could have contributed to the impression that Ahmadinejad did not win. University of Tehran polls show that in the first few weeks of the campaign his support dropped precipitously and he did not enjoy majority support in the city of Tehran. But in the week before the election, his support recovered outside the capital.

Going into the election 57% said they expected Ahmadinejad to win. Thus it is not surprising that, in several post-election polls, more than seven in ten said they saw Ahmadinejad as the legitimate president. About eight in ten said the election was free and fair.

The polls did reveal some reservations about the government. Less than a majority expressed full confidence in the Guardian Council (42%) and the Ministry of the Interior (38%). While over eight in ten said they were satisfied with the current system of government, in June less than a majority (49%) said they were very satisfied and this number dropped to 41% in July.

However none of the polls found indications of support for regime change. Large majorities, including majorities of Mousavi supporters, endorse the Islamist character of the regime such as having a body of Islamic scholars with the power to veto laws they see as contrary to sharia.

To address the possibility that the data collected within Iran may have been fabricated, PIPA compared the patterns of responses, including within subgroups, in data collected inside Iran to those collected by calling into Iran from the outside. Steven Kull comments, "The patterns of responses at many levels are so similar, whether the data was collected inside Iran or by calling into Iran, that it is hard to conclude that these data were fabricated."

Another concern is that Iranian respondents were not answering candidly out of fear of some type of reprisal for making statements in support of the opposition or critical of the regime, particularly in the post-election environment. As noted above, on some questions majorities expressed views that were less than fully laudatory of the government.

Still there was the fact that after the election, the numbers expressing support for Mousavi diminished suggests that some self-censoring may have been occurring. Thus PIPA put special emphasis on analyzing the responses of those who felt bold enough to say that they voted for the opposition on the assumption that they would be frank on other issues as well. While Mousavi supporters are less affirmative of the legitimacy of the regime than the public as a whole, still a majority says that they believe that Ahmadinejad is the legitimate president and affirm the Islamist nature of the regime.

Some analysts have suggested that if the opposition were to gain power this would lead to fundamental changes in the Iranian posture toward the US. Focusing on those respondents who said they voted for Mousavi, as an approximation of the opposition,
PIPA found that a majority were ready to negotiate with the US on a number of issues, while the Iranian public as a whole was more divided. However, Mousavi supporters, like the general public, were quite negative in their views of the US government and were strongly committed to Iran's nuclear program.

A majority of Mousavi supporters did favor diplomatic relations with the US, and were ready to make a deal whereby Iran would preclude developing nuclear weapons through intrusive international inspections in exchange for the removal of sanctions. However, this was equally true of the majority of all Iranians.

Questionnaire with Findings, Methodology (PDF)

As the European Union implements a new treaty aimed at helping member countries work together, and as President Barack Obama prepares to receive a Nobel Prize awarded partly for his efforts at international cooperation, a WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of people in 21 nations around the world finds that publics in 14 of them think their governments should be more ready to cooperate with others to achieve mutual gains.

Opening ceremonies of the 15th United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark (Photo: UNFCCC)

However, in six nations more people demur and say that their government tends to be too willing to compromise and is often taken advantage of.

The release of the poll's findings come at a time when international cooperation figures prominently in the news. World leaders are gathering in Copenhagen to consider cooperative options for addressing climate change. In Europe, the new Lisbon Treaty took effect on Tuesday which is meant to draw European countries into a more highly integrated union.

President Obama, meanwhile, will receive the Nobel Peace Prize on Dec. 10, which he won largely for taking a more cooperative stance with the rest of the world. And indeed the poll found that in 15 of 19 nations the US is now seen as generally cooperative.

On average across all nations surveyed, 55% of those polled believe that their leaders "should be more ready to act cooperatively to achieve mutual gains." Thirty-nine percent of those polled say their governments tend to be "too willing to compromise and are often taken advantage of."

The poll shows the highest levels of support for greater cooperation are among Turks (81%), Egyptians (76%), and Nigerians (73%). Palestinians are also among the highest (69%), a positive indicator for potential Middle East peace negotiations.

Publics calling for greater cooperation also are found in the largest and most powerful countries, including Americans (54%), Chinese (63%), Russians (54%) and Indians (59%). Though Indians favor greater cooperation, only 42 percent of Pakistanis say the same.

Interestingly, the most distinct cluster of nations with low numbers calling for greater cooperation are in the EU. Less than half feel their government should be more cooperative in Britain (31%), Poland (34%), France (43%), and Germany (47%). This may be because they feel that they are already cooperative enough, especially in the context of the EU and in their relations with the United States.

Very large numbers feel that their country tends to be too willing to compromise and is often taken advantage of in Mexico (63%) and South Korea (71%). This may be due to their close relationship with the United States in which America clearly plays the dominant role.

Large majorities favor greater cooperation in Hong Kong (72%) and Macao (60%), but only 42 percent feel that way in Taiwan.

WorldPublicOpinion.org conducted the poll of 20,349 respondents in 21 nations that comprise 64 percent of the world's population. This includes most of the largest nations--China, India, the United States, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Russia--as well as Mexico, Chile, Germany, Great Britain, France, Poland, Ukraine, Kenya, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, the Palestinian territories, and South Korea. Polling was also conducted in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. Not all questions were asked to all nations. The margins of error range from +/-3 to 4 percentage points. The surveys were conducted across the different nations between April 4 and July 9, 2009.

WorldPublicOpinion.org, a collaborative project involving research centers from around the world, is managed by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland.

Assessment of US Cooperativeness

Asked to assess whether the United States is generally cooperative in its relations with other countries, publics in 15 of the 19 nations said that the US is generally cooperative, with an average of 59 percent saying that it is cooperative and 30 percent saying it is not.

"Clearly President Obama has turned the tide in the image of the US as a leader in the world. When Obama called for greater cooperation at the UN, most people saw the US as ready to carry its share of the water," comments Steven Kull, director of WPO.
The only nations to say that the US is not cooperative all have Muslim majorities: Egypt (62%), Iraq (58%), Pakistan (54%), and Turkey (45%). Interestingly, the governments of all four of these nations have close working relations with the US.

Assessment of China's Cooperativeness

Asked to assess whether China is generally cooperative, views are more mixed but still predominantly positive. Eleven nations rate China as cooperative, seven as not cooperative, and one is divided. On average, 53% say they think China is generally cooperating with other countries, and 35% say they do not think so.

China's overall cooperation with other nations draws a positive response from a majority of respondents around the world. Outside China, the strongest support came again from Pakistan, where 94% say they think China is cooperative, followed by Azerbaijan with 89% and Ukraine with 81%. The strongest negative response was from South Korea, where 68% of respondents do not think China is cooperative, followed by Great Britain with 66% and France with 63%. Sixty-one percent of Americans say China does not cooperate.

In China, 63% of those polled on the mainland say their government should be more open to international cooperation.

A new poll of 15 nations, most of them in the developing world, finds that majorities of the people canvassed want their governments to take steps to fight climate change, even if that entails costs. People signaled they would support public measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions and step up adaptation measures. For example, respondents would support higher fuel efficiency standards for cars, preserving or expanding forests, and extending funding to vulnerable countries so they can develop hardier crops suited to more severe climates.

"The poll's findings shed light on global attitudes at a particularly important moment: the run-up to the conference on climate change to be held December 7-18 in Copenhagen. Hearing from people in the developing world offers a new lens on this issue," says Katherine Sierra, World Bank Vice President for Sustainable Development.

Carried out by WorldPublicOpinion.org and commissioned by the World Bank, the poll questioned 13,518 respondents in 15 nations-- Bangladesh, China, Egypt, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Russia, Senegal, Turkey, the United States, and Vietnam.

Other key findings include:

•   Public concern about climate change is high worldwide, but it's generally higher in developing countries.
•   Publics, particularly in developing countries, believe climate change is already having negative effects.
•   In most countries, wealthy and poor alike, large majorities are willing to pay to fight climate change.
•   Support for increased adaptation funding to poor countries is widespread worldwide

"It is encouraging indeed to see strong across-the-board support for committing to emissions limits in both developed and developing nations, since behavior change and attitudes will help determine whether we succeed or fail in addressing this global issue," says Marianne Fay, World Bank Chief Economist for Sustainable Development and Co-Director of the World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change.

Ms Fay explained that the poll was commissioned as a follow-up to the recently released WDR. The aim was to gain a better understanding of how the recommendations of the Report to invest substantially and immediately to manage climate change ("Act now, act together, and act differently") resonate in a cross-section of countries.

In the low-income country of Vietnam, for example, 98% say their government should commit to limiting emissions as part of a deal, and 93% support the same course in the absence of a deal. At the other end of the wealth spectrum, the people of France express 97% support if an agreement is reached at Copenhagen, and 87% if no agreement emerges.

Majorities in 14 of 15 countries are willing to pay to fight global climate change. In each country, the poll asked people whether they were willing to bear higher prices for energy and other goods, as part of taking steps to fight climate change. These price increases were calculated as 0.5% and 1.0% of each country's per capita GDP, and then described to respondents as defined monthly amounts in local currency. Majorities in six countries--China (68%), Vietnam (59%), Japan (53%), Iran (51%) and Mexico (51%)--say they are willing to pay 1%. In addition, majorities in an additional eight countries are willing to pay between 0.5% and 1.0%.

Majorities in most countries also support measures that would raise costs for energy and transportation.

Majorities in all countries support "limiting the rate of constructing coal-fired power plants, even if this increases the cost of energy." In China, which is highly reliant on coal, 67% support this measure. On average across all countries polled, 68% support the idea (31% strongly) and 26% oppose it (8% strongly).

Similarly, majorities in 12 countries support "gradually increasing the requirements for fuel efficiency in automobiles, even if this raises the cost of cars and bus fares." Majorities in 11 countries support "gradually reducing government subsidies that favor private transportation, even if this raises its cost." Majorities in all countries polled support "preserving or expanding forested areas, even if this means less land for agriculture or construction."

The poll also asked about helping poor countries adapt to the effects of climate change. Fourteen majorities and one plurality say their countries "should contribute to international efforts to help poor countries deal with these climate-induced changes." Many developing countries (such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Kenya, and Senegal) express more than 90% support for acting in solidarity with other countries facing problems like their own.

WorldPublicOpinion.org operates as a collaborative project involving research centers from around the world that is managed by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland. The margins of error for each country range from +/-3 to 4 percentage points. The surveys were conducted across the different nations in September and October 2009.

The World Development Report can be downloaded by visiting: http://www.worldbank.org/wdr2010
The World Bank's climate change blog is at: http://blogs.worldbank.org/climatechange

Alternative WPO link for: Full Report, including questionnaire with full findings (PDF)

Many of the results in the digest are surprising, and they challenge long-held stereotypes about attitudes toward world order and international cooperation, both in the United States and abroad. This digest represents a compilation, analysis, and synthesis of existing polling data, rather than new survey research. Its value added lies in its comprehensive coverage of major issue areas, as well as its juxtaposition of global and U.S. attitudes toward each area. Getting a clearer picture of what citizens in the United States and abroad want is important for policymakers, because public attitudes will shape prospects for effective multilateral cooperation in the twenty-first century. Read an overview of the project.

Read the full report (PDF 12MB)

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Originally published on openDemocracy

To a Kremlin analyst in 1968 America may have looked similar to the way that Iran looks to some American analysts today. Large-scale demonstrations to protest the Vietnam war and disrupt the Democratic convention in Chicago may have led to some to conclude that the long-awaited collapse of capitalism was close at hand. Indeed some demonstrators called for the overthrow of the system, some were explicitly pro-communist, and some government leaders portrayed the demonstrators as a threat to the American way of life. But if Kremlin analysts had come to those conclusions, they would have been wrong.

And if they had called for the Soviet Union to pursue a confrontational approach to the United States on the basis that this would hasten its demise they would have been misguided.

Today some call for the United States to refrain from negotiating with Iran on the basis that the recent demonstrations are a sign that the Iranian system is cracking. It is better, they say, to increase the pressure on an already stumbling government whose people have turned against them; the government that is likely to replace it will be much more accommodating. They too are misguided.

A new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of Iranians--conducted by native Farsi speakers calling into Iran, thus bypassing any possible government controls--reveals that large majorities continue to support the Iranian system.

Naturally this raises the question of whether people are answering honestly in an autocratic environment where people are being imprisoned for protesting against the government. But we can focus just on those who were brave enough to say that they did vote for the opposition candidate Mousavi. Presumably they are being frank in response to other questions as well.

What we find is that those who openly support Mousavi are different from others. Unlike the others a majority of Mousavi supporters that the press should be completely free from government controls (59%) and that Iran's relations with the west have worsened under Ahmadinejad (57%).

As compared to others, Mousavi supporters are far more likely to say that the election was not free and fair, that they do not have confidence in the election results and that the Ahmadinejad is not the legitimate president of Iran.

However a modest majority of Mousavi supporters says the opposite.

More important, they express support for the Iranian system. Fifty-three percent say that a body of religious scholars should have the right to overturn laws they believe are contrary to the Koran. Two thirds say they trust the government in Tehran to do the right thing at least some of the time. Majorities say they have some confidence in the Guardian Council (55%) and the President (62%).

Furthermore, even if these people were to have a powerful influence over Iranian foreign policy it would not signal a transformation of US-Iranian relations. Only 35 percent say they trust Obama, and majorities have pernicious assumptions about US goals such as the belief that the US is hostile to Islam (68%). Like the rest of the sample, less than half say they oppose attacks on US troops in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf.

Perhaps most significant, only 43 percent say they would be ready to give up enriching uranium in exchange for removing sanctions.

This does not mean that all the news is bad. Three quarters of Mousavi supporters, like two thirds of all Iranians polled, would be willing to preclude developing nuclear weapons--either through stopping enrichment or allowing unlimited inspections--in exchange for sanctions.

Similarly three quarters of Mousavi supporters, like two thirds of the whole sample, would support Iran establishing diplomatic relations with the United States.

These numbers do not say what the Iranian government will or will not be willing to do in a negotiation, but they do tell us something about the normative environment that exists in Iran today.

Altogether they suggest that an alternative strategy of refraining from negotiation in the hope that the Iranian government is profoundly weakened from internal dissent is unlikely to be any more promising than if a similar strategy had been tried by Moscow in 1968.